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This research examines the distortionary effects of a discovered and 
undeveloped sequential modular offshore project under five different designs for a production-
sharing agreement (PSA). The model differs from previous research by looking at the effect of 
taxation from the perspective of a host government, where the objective is to maximize 
government utility over government revenue generated by the project and the non-pecuniary 
benefits to society. This research uses Modern Asset Pricing (MAP) theory, which is able to 
provide a good measure of the asset value accruing to various stakeholders in the project 
combined with the optimal decision rule for the development of the investment opportunity. 
Monte Carlo simulation was also applied to incorporate into the model the most important 
sources of risk associated with the project and to account for non-linearity in the cash flows. For 
a complete evaluation of how the fiscal system affects the project development, an investor’s 
behavioral model was constructed, incorporating three operational decisions: investment timing, 
capacity size and early abandonment. The model considers four sources of uncertainty that 
affect the project value and the firm’s optimal decision: the long run oil price and short-run 
deviations from that price, cost escalation and the reservoir recovery rate. 
The optimizations outcomes show that all fiscal systems evaluated produce 
distortion over the companies’ optimal decisions, and companies adjust their choices to avoid 
taxation in different ways according to the fiscal system characteristics. Moreover, it is revealed 
that fiscal systems with tax provisions that try to capture additional project profits based on 
production profitability measures leads to stronger distortions in the project investment and 
output profile. It is also shown that a model based on a fixed percentage rate is the system that 
creates the least distortion. This is because companies will be subjected to the same 
government share of profit oil independently of any operational decision which they can make to 
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The petroleum sector plays an important role in the economy of resource-rich 
countries. It is one of the major sources of government revenue and a significant actor in 
macroeconomic development, normally associated with large investment, job creation and a 
trade balance surplus. 
The way that the fiscal system is designed is a decisive factor in petroleum 
companies’ investment decisions. The tax system should be balanced in a way that rewards the 
government with a fair share of the petroleum activities without discouraging investment. 
Several studies have tried to identify and understand the effects that different 
fiscal systems have on companies’ decision making in the natural resource industry. The natural 
behavior of any tax-paying company is to adjust its optimal investment and operating decisions 
to avoid taxation, and for that reason, any model that intends to analyze a company’s response 
to taxation should incorporate the greatest array of possible decisions available to the company. 
Nevertheless, most of the previous research in the area is limited in the range of 
company decisions it evaluates. Based on traditional capital budget methods, such as the 
discounted cash flow (DCF), these studies typically focus on a single myopic decision, to invest 
or not to invest, not allowing any additional flexibility. Moreover, studies that compare different 
tax system designs normally focus only on investors’ objectives, such as the after tax value, 
break-even price, minimum economic field size, internal rate of return (IRR) or the government 
take1. 
Based on these indicators, previous studies created rankings comparing fiscal 
systems’ attractiveness to investors, which is a valid outcome for companies deciding where to 
invest. However, this approach does not incorporate indicators of the host government 
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objectives, and has a limited applicability to support government when it is deciding over the 
design of the tax system. This research has the objective of identifying the distortionary effects 
created by a Production-Sharing Agreement (PSA) fiscal system, in its different forms of 
implementation, from the perspective of the government’s objective to maximize government 
utility. The idea is that fiscal systems are to some degree endogenous, and governments will set 
fiscal systems not with firm’s interests in mind, but with their own interests in mind. What type of 
PSA system will a government choose when it wishes to balance the present value of receipts 
with maximal production of oil from a reservoir? 
The theory used to answer this question is the Modern Asset Pricing approach, 
which is able to provide a good measure of the asset value attributable to the firm and the 
government combined with the optimal decision rule for the development of this investment 
opportunity. In my thesis I capture the distortionary effects of taxation via a behavioral model of 
firms’ decision over the optimal timing to invest, the capacity size and the abandonment date of 
a discovered and undeveloped sequential modular offshore petroleum project. The model also 
includes four sources of uncertainty: the short-run and long-run oil price movements, the 
recovery rate from reserves and cost escalation, incorporating the most important sources of 
risk associated with the project. 
A distortionary effect is understood as any alteration of the decision making by 
companies in response to taxation compared to the optimal decision that would have been 
taken without the presence of these taxes. Government utility is assumed to be a function of the 
present value of the government revenue and the percentage of recoverable reserves that were 
produced by the end of the production license. The second indicator is a proxy for government 
objectives of expanding exports, attracting investment and creating jobs through oil extraction. 
This modeling approach is useful to investigate situations where the design of the 
fiscal system may result in higher government take or tax revenues but a lower level of total 
production. Looking at this result with traditional indicators can lead to erroneous and 
incomplete conclusions. Throughout this document, it is possible to notice that this kind of 
scenario is quite common. 
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A PSA is one of the most common types of fiscal systems implemented by oil-
producing countries. It has its origins in Indonesia in 1960, and its main characteristic is that the 
ownership of the produced oil remains with the government, which rewards the companies with 
cost and investments recovery and a share of the profit oil. The PSA framework encompasses 
different fiscal system designs: from a fixed rate to several kinds of sliding scale methods to 
share the profit oil by imposing diverse percentage limits and depreciation schedule for the cost 
recovery.  
After the discovery of a very prolific new sedimentary basin in the southeast 
coast, the Brazilian government changed the fiscal system in this area from a concession 
royalty tax contract to a production-sharing agreement fiscal system. This research uses this 
case study to identify major characteristics of the financial parameters of production-sharing 
contracts to assess the behavioral response of the firms in order to provide additional 
information to the government in their decision about the fiscal system to be implemented in this 
area. While the basic model and the simulated parameters are adjusted to the current Brazilian 
regulatory framework, the conclusions can be extended to any project with similar 
characteristics, mainly undeveloped sequential modular offshore projects with uncertainties. The 
government utility measurement approach should be extended to any study of optimal taxation. 
This document is divided as follows: In Chapter 2, the literature review inspects 
previous research about the same problem evaluated here. The analysis focuses on three 
different aspects of those studies: the optimal extraction theoretical approach, the firms’ 
behavioral model and the measurement output. 
Chapter 3 provides some background information about the development of the 
Brazilian upstream petroleum industry, the change in the fiscal system and some basic 
concepts of production-sharing fiscal systems. 
The model developed in this thesis is described in Chapter 4. It starts with a 
review of the basic ideas of the Modern Asset Pricing approach, mainly risk adjustment at 
source and operational flexibility. Then it shows the most relevant characteristic of the oil fields 
in the area, which is the sequential modular development. Then, it presents the model output: 
the maximization of the government utility. Furthermore, a behavioral model of the companies’ 
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response to the fiscal system is developed. In the model, companies have compounded options 
concerning the starting time of production, the capacity size and the abandonment date of each 
module of production. 
Fours sources of uncertainties were incorporated into the model. The first two, 
considered the systematic risk, were the short run deviation and the long run equilibrium oil 
price are modeled with the risk adjusted two-factor stochastic process from Schwartz and Smith 
(2000). Cost escalation was the third uncertainty considered in the model, included due to the 
importance of cost recovery in PSA fiscal systems. Finally, the recovery rate is uncertain, 
important because production is commonly used in sliding scale fiscal systems. 
Chapter 5 estimates the parameters used in the simulations. First, it displays the 
data of a real case field to be the base of all optimizations. Then it describes the procedures for 
the estimation of the parameters of the stochastic processes for oil prices and cost escalation. 
Furthermore, it defines the range of possible decisions to be made by the government and the 
companies. 
The results from the optimizations are presented in Chapter 6, as well as some 
analysis of changes in companies’ decisions. The first valuation finds the optimal decision and 
the value of the project if it was subjected to no tax, the “reference value”. Next, the project is 
simulated in a “basic tax” scenario, which means that the project was exposed only to the taxes 
that are not related to the production-sharing fiscal system. Finally, the outcome of different 
production-sharing tax systems models is presented. 
Chapter 7 compares five different designs for the profit oil split and outline the 
most important insight from the model. Chapter 8 displays concluding remarks and possible 






 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review focuses on studies that inspect the same problem evaluated 
by this thesis, which is how to evaluate the distortion effect of taxation in the petroleum industry.  
A recent comprehensive review of research methods and models about issues in extractive 
resource taxation was made by James Smith (2012a). This review builds on Smith, listing 
additional publications and some complementary comments. In addition, special attention is 
devoted to identifying the measurement indicator used by these studies to evaluate the 
distortionary effect and the comparison of different fiscal systems. 
The uniqueness of the deposit location, the exhaustibility of the resource and the 
existence of substantial rents are the foremost differences of the extraction industry from the 
other sectors. The natural resource extraction sector also presents some important features that 
increase the analysis difficulty and attract extra attention to the taxation subject. These features 
are the high sunk cost; the production life extends over several years; the many sources of 
uncertainty, such as geological, technical, political and economic; the importance of natural 
resource taxation as a source of government revenue; the different design of tax systems, and; 
the combination of all these factors (Broadway & Keen, 2010). 
Smith (2012a) advises that the analysis of the influence of the tax system in the 
natural resource sector must be a combination of research in optimal investment and extraction 
of natural resources and research in optimal taxation policy. He also states that for a complete 
assessment of the tax system, a behavioral model is necessary to evaluate the tax avoidance of 
the company given different designs and tax levels. 
The next section will discuss the literature on optimal extraction in a more 
general manner. Furthermore, a review of literature that emphasizes evaluation of fiscal 




2.1  Literature on Optimal Extraction 
The literature on optimal investment and extraction of nonrenewable natural 
resources can be divided into distinct groups. At one extreme we find the neoclassical theory of 
natural resource extraction, at the other extreme the reservoir simulation models; between those 
two extremes we have the decline curve methods. In addition, Smith (2012a) also identifies the 
contingent claim analysis as a distinct group. 
The neoclassical theory of nonrenewable natural resources extraction is derived 
from the work of Hotelling (1931). This approach adopts simplified assumptions about resource 
production and uses optimal control first order conditions to identify the optimal path for 
extraction. Several additional authors recognized other issues for the problem. Pindyck (1978) 
adds exploration and the discovery of new deposits; Campbell (1980) includes capacity 
constraints and Holland (2003) studied the extraction sequence of deposits of different quality 
under capacity constraints. However, none of these included the distortion created by taxes. 
A very comprehensive use of neoclassic theory to examine the distortionary 
effect of tax on the optimal extraction path of exhaustible resources was done by Dasgupta & 
Heal (1979). They analyzed the effect of three different tax methods and the depletion 
allowance in the optimal extraction path. They defined distortion as a “deviation from the 
intertemporal competitive equilibrium allocation, using this latter as an ideal benchmark.”  
In their study, they conclude that a tax on units sold is non-distortionary if the tax 
rises at the rate of interest, but it creates distortions if it is constant; a constant tax rate over 
profit preserves the same extraction path of the non-tax case, only reducing the competitive 
value of the deposit, but if this rate changes over time it is distortionary. Royalty tax, or a 
percentage tax over the gross revenue, is distortionary, and the depletion allowance is non-
distortionary if calculated over the shadow price of the deposit, but creates distortions if 
calculated over the price. 
One of the key arguments against the use of this method to evaluate the effects 
of a fiscal system is that the final outcome from the model represents an aggregate optimal 
price path and not the optimal extraction from an individual project (Smith, 2012a). 
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On the other extreme of the optimal extraction analysis, Smith (2012a) highlights 
some studies based on reservoir simulation models where the production profile of a field is 
estimated based on the rules of fluid dynamics and on principles of material balance. Because 
of the complex requirement for estimation and the limited application outside the field with 
similar physical characteristics, this method has limited application for economic studies. The 
results of some of these studies lead to unrealistic outcomes or converge to more simplified 
models as decline rates. This method is rarely used for economic analysis and for the 
evaluation of tax distortions. 
In the middle ground between the simplicity of the neoclassical theory and the 
complexity of reservoir simulation models, the decline rate models add physical dynamics of 
reservoir extraction in a generic and simple version. Arps’ (1945) seminal paper developed the 
decline curves that have become standard in the petroleum industry. The general equation is 
the hyperbolic decline curve, while the exponential and the harmonic decline are the two 
extreme cases, where the hyperbolic coefficient is set to be equal to zero and one, respectively 
(Makinde et al., 2011). 
In practice, most of the uses of decline rate curves in the economic literature 
have assumed the case where the hyperbolic coefficient is set to zero, which returns to the 
exponential decline case. This curve produces a generic representation of the field production 
profile that is sufficient for most of the analysis of economic policy (Smith & Paddock, 1984; 
Adelman, 1990; Smith, 1995; Smith, 2012b).  
Even without an explicit decline rate equation, considering the production as 
declining over time is one of the primary assumptions used in engineering economics 
applications, like the traditional discounted cash flow models and their variations. This method is 
also the base of several works that apply real option approach valuation in the analysis of 
petroleum projects and how the fiscal systems affect them. 
Finally, Smith (2012a) reviewed studies based on the Contingent Claim 
framework, also called Real Option (RO) or Modern Asset Pricing. That analysis has its origin in 
the analogy of a real world project to a financial asset (call option) and has introduced important 
consideration about the management flexibility and project uncertainties. Trigeorgis (1996), 
8 
 
Schwartz & Trigeorgis (2004) and Dias (2004) present good reviews about the seminal papers 
in real option theory. Laughton (2007) provides a description of the evolution of the valuation 
procedures from the traditional static discounted cash flow until the real option analysis based 
on the Banff Taxonomy. 
The Contingent Claim approach recognizes similarities between real world 
project investments with a financial option asset. The investor holds the opportunity to develop a 
project, until a specific relinquishment date, by incurring the development cost and expecting to 
receive future revenues from the project. This methodology was introduced by the solution of 
partial differential equations, but as the number of decision variables and uncertain inputs 
increase, the resolution of the problem by analytical solution has become more complex. It 
opened space to the development of different simulation and numerical methods solution, such 
as binomial lattices, finite differences and Monte Carlo simulation (Cortazar, 2004; Boyle, 1977; 
Cortazar & Schwartz, 1998, Pickles & Smith, 1993; Hull, 2006). 
Moreover, recent RO applications can be viewed as an extension of the 
traditional DCF method with the advances introduced by the MAP theory, operational flexibility 
and the risk adjustment at source. This allows the models to incorporate specific elements of the 
projects, for example the physical decline of the production rate, the cost characteristics of the 
project and tax system, and a more sophisticated treatment of risk.  
Lund (1992), Blake and Roberts (2006), Bradley (1998), MacKie-Mason (1990) 
and Zhang (1997) are among the authors that use this technique to study the optimal 
development of a petroleum field in the presence of tax. 
2.2  Literature on Distortionary Effects of the Fiscal System: Behavioral Models and 
Measurement Indicators 
In the review of literature on tax policy, Smith (2012a) identifies two different 
groups of studies that discuss how to measure the effects of the tax system in the firms’ 
decisions. On one side is the Scenario approach, which groups all studies that focus attention 
on only one decision available to the firms, which is the initial decision to invest if the project has 
positive NPV or not to invest if the project has a negative NPV. On the other side are studies 
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which include additional decisions to the firms’ behavioral model of, such as the decision to 
delay the investment or to change the capacity. 
Most of these studies view the fiscal system distortions from the point of view of 
investors, using measurement indicators as NPV, IRR and break-even price. This thesis 
introduces a new measurement indicator in the analysis of distortionary effect of fiscal systems, 
the government utility. Therefore, to complement the review of the treatment of firms’ decisions, 
special attention is devoted to the measurement indicators used in the previous research. 
Most of the applications that are based on the Scenario approach are derived 
from traditional engineering evaluation methods, which consider deterministic scenarios of 
reserves, production, capacity size, start year, cost and prices, to determine an expected cash 
flow for the project. The principal outcome from those models is to identify if the project NPV is 
positive or negative, and the tax effect is measured by the impact on the minimum economic 
size of the deposit, the break-even price, the government take or the after-tax rate of return. In 
addition, the tax system is compared for different scenarios of those base assumptions. 
Kemp (1992) compares the pre and post-tax NPV and IRR and the tax take of 
the North Sea’s fiscal systems. Smith (1995) studies the effect of the tax regimes on the 
company decision to invest in three South America countries. The benchmark is the “no tax” 
case and the distortion is measured by the increase in the break-even price to develop the 
reserve or in the minimum economic field size. Tordo (2007) ranks four sliding scale production-
sharing tax systems for four different fields’ sizes and characteristics based on the break-even 
price, IRR, profitability index and NPV per barrel. Nakhle (2008) compares different fiscal 
system on UK over time and five international tax models based on the project NPV and 
government take. 
All these studies use the single decision parameter (invest or not invest) and 
deterministic parameters for the development of the field in different scenarios, and compare 
them based on the firms’ positions regarding the NPV or other investors’ profitability indicators. 
The outcome from the government side is only analyzed by the share of the government in the 
project profits, with no comment about the total government revenue, the deadweight loss and 
the reserves left in the ground. 
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Daniel et al (2010) evaluate the impact of several fiscal regimes at the point of 
the decision to develop a petroleum discovery. The model advances from the previous ones by 
assessing the model output from the perspective of a host government and also introduces 
more sophisticated analysis techniques, such as considering the price as a stochastic stationary 
first-order autoregressive process. The study presents several indicators to evaluate the fiscal 
systems, such as neutrality, revenue-raising potential, risk to government, stability, among 
others. However, the neutrality2 of the different tax systems is compared based only on 
incomplete indicators, such as the average effective tax rate (government take), the break-even 
price and the marginal effective tax rate. 
Because the Scenario approach focuses on the initial investment decision, its 
performance in evaluating the firms’ behavior according to the tax system design is restricted:  
“Tax neutrality is limited to the question of whether the field will be developed, not how and 
when” (Smith, 2012a). The Scenario approach does not analyze the value derived from the 
operational flexibility and the distortions that can emerge from them. 
The importance of management flexibility is a key aspect in the Real Option 
theory. The capacity to revise initial plans as new information is available brings skewedness to 
the distribution of the value of a project, via increasing upside potential and limiting losses 
(Trigeorgis & Mason, 2004). Laughton (1998b) uses dynamic programming methods to prove 
that the value of an upstream petroleum project increases if we consider the effect of the 
options to delay exploration, delineation and development phases and the option of early 
abandonment. 
Smith (2012b) observes that some authors have introduced additional decision 
parameters to measure effects of taxation in optimal tax policy research. Some studies have 
added flexibility on the timing of investment while others have the scale of investment as the 
decision parameter, but only a limited number of authors combine these two operational 
decisions. 
                                               
2
 A fiscal regime is considered neutral if has no effect in the investors’ optimal decision in comparison to 
the no tax case scenario. 
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The comparison between a real world investment project and an American call 
option, and the value created by the flexibility to delay that investment, was the first 
improvement of the real option approach in relation to traditional models of evaluation. The 
assessment of the value of waiting in an undeveloped oil field has been explored by numerous 
researchers (Laughton, 1998b; Cortazar & Schwartz, 1998; Paddock, Siegel & Smith, 1987).  
The use of real option methods to evaluate the effects of the fiscal system in the 
company’s timing decision raised the attention of some researchers. Zhang (1997) studies the 
impact of the UK fiscal system on the waiting decision to develop an oil field under uncertainty 
based on an expectation operator conditional on the information available at time zero. 
Panteghini (2005) uses dynamic programing to evaluate the distortions of an asymmetric tax 
system on the timing decision of a multistage project. Mackie-Mason (1990) uses the stochastic 
equilibrium valuation method to identify optimal dynamic waiting to invest strategy in the 
presence of nonlinear taxes. 
Nevertheless, these studies looked solely at the effect of the fiscal system from 
the firms’ perspective or from incomplete government objectives. Zhang’s analysis measures 
neutrality by the increase in the optimal price development trigger and the efficiency of the fiscal 
regime in collecting the economic rent. Panteghini (2005) also looks at some optimal trigger 
point for the options to invest in each stage of the project. Finally Mackie-Mason (1990) 
analyzes the effect of percentage depletion allowance on critical development price and asset 
value.  
The option to alter the scale or intensity of development is another variable that 
has been investigated as a measure of neutrality of a fiscal system. Firms perceive the scale of 
development as a trade-off between a higher installed and production capacity against higher 
required investment expenditures (Dias, Rocha & Teixeira, 2003). Lund (1992) uses Monte 
Carlo simulations, where companies are allowed to decide over the development cost at year 
zero, to prove that the Norwegian petroleum fiscal system creates distortions compared to the 
no-tax and the Brown-tax scenarios. The distortionary effect is measured by the difference in 
the scale of development but no considerations were made from the government perspective. 
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Blake & Roberts (2006) use the same approach as Lund (1992) to compare 
several different fiscal regimes. They create fiscal systems’ rankings and performed several 
sensitivity analyses over the price volatility, convenience yield, risk-free rate and initial oil price. 
The different fiscal systems were ranked based on after-tax project values and the distortion 
effect (the decrease in project value with tax compared with the no tax value). 
As stated by Smith (2012a), “relatively few analyses or models provide the firm 
with options regarding both the timing of the investment and the intensity of development”. Dias, 
Rocha & Teixeira (2003) estimated the optimal investment scale and timing of an undeveloped 
oil field using the real option approach, but no considerations were made about the fiscal 
system.  
Smith (2012b) is one of the few researchers that has considered the effects of 
taxation on the firms’ decision over intensity of investment and timing of development. The 
model analyzes the distortionary effects of six generic fiscal systems3 compared to non-tax and 
Brown-tax scenarios. The model considers that the companies have two decision variables to 
maximize their profit, the rate of decline (), defined by the optimal intensity of development, 
and the optimal time () that companies decide to start enhanced oil recovery (EOR). All fiscal 
systems are calibrated to tax 66% of the field rent. The most important results are described 
below. 
The first model output presents the change in the optimal decline rate and 
optimal time for EOR at different levels of EOR effectiveness (λ = 2.0			λ = 2.5). It indicates 
that RRT and PCS+i are neutral and in the IRR the firm will not even start the EOR. However 
these outputs indicators have no economic meaning. 
The second measurement of distortion, the total project value (sum of the NPV of 
the government and NPV of the company), is a more valid indicator because it raises the 
problem of the deadweight loss created by the fiscal system. The results show again that the 
                                               
3
 NT: no-tax scenario; ROY: fixed royalty over gross revenue; CIT: corporate income tax; PSC: fixed 
production sharing contract; PSC+I: PSC with uplift for costs carried forward; RF: PSC with progressive 
R-factor sliding scale; RF+i: RF with uplift for costs carried forward; IRR: PSC with in sliding scale based 
on company IRR; RRT: resource rent tax. 
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RRT and PCS+i are neutral, the ROY, CIT and IRR results in the highest decrease in the 
project value and the PSC model creates small distortions. 
In the search for a measurement of fiscal progressivity, Smith compares the 
effect of an increase in the price and the government take considering that the company 
response is static or dynamic.  In the first, companies do not change the initial development 
program in response to an increase in price, and in the second, companies are able to adjust 
optimal intensity and time decisions by anticipating the rise in prices. The output shows that with 
dynamic response, companies tend to adjust their optimal decision to avoid the progressive tax 
and the government take remains the same or is reduced, with exception of the RF. 
The drawback of Smith’s (2012b) paper is that while he recognizes the advances 
of the real option approach regarding the incorporation of operational flexibility, he ignores the 
advances brought by the risk adjustment at source in the estimation of the project value to 
various stakeholders.  
The review above presents the research that tried to capture the distortions 
created by a resource tax system. These distortions are produced by the natural behavioral 
response of the companies, who try to avoid the tax exposition by altering their optimal 
decisions for the development of the project. It was possible to identify how previous studies 
accounted for the response of investors in different levels with different modeling techniques. 
However, a missing point in all the cited references was a correct and complete measurement 
of this distortionary effect from the perspective of the host government, the one that has the 
tools to adjust the fiscal system in a way to maximize its utility. 
As seen above, the most commonly used indicator of government objectives in a 
petroleum project is the government take. This indicator only measures the share of the 
government in the project without providing any consideration of the amount of the total 
government revenue and the deadweight loss created by the tax. 
In the presence of operational flexibilities that can alter the project value in response to 
the fiscal system, this approach can lead to erroneous conclusions in the definition of the 
optimal fiscal system design. The important aspect to be measured by the government is not 
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their share in the profit, but how much value the project can generate for the government and 
society. 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on optimal extraction of natural 
resources and analysis of the distortionary effect of the fiscal system in this industry. The next 
chapter will present some background information about the recent development of the oil 









This chapter presents the background information necessary to understand the 
context of this research. It is divided into three sections. The first two sections summarize the 
development of the Brazilian oil industry and the recent change of the fiscal system. The last 
one explains the basic concept of a PSA.  
After the discovery of a new prolific petroleum area, the Brazilian government 
changed the fiscal system from a royalty-based tax system to a production-sharing agreement. 
The PSA is one of the most common types of fiscal system implemented by oil-producing 
countries and covers a great variety of fiscal system designs. This research intends to identify 
major characteristics of the fiscal parameters of a PSA and analyze its distortionary effects over 
a firm’s optimal decisions to assist the decision over the better fiscal system design to be 
implemented.  
3.1  Recent Development of the Brazilian Petroleum Industry 
Over the last two decades, the upstream sector of the oil industry in Brazil has 
undergone significant changes. After more than 40 years in which the National Oil Company 
(NOC), Petrobras, operated solely to represent the State constitutional monopoly over the 
activities of exploration and production, in 1995 the Brazilian congress approved Constitutional 
Amendment No 9, allowing the government to hire private companies to carry out petroleum 
activities under the terms provided by Law 9478/97. 
This law created the National Regulatory Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and 
Biofuel (ANP) and the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE), and reformulated the main 
rules for the sector. ANP was established as the entity responsible for promoting the regulation, 
contracting and supervision of all activities of the oil and gas industry in the country, while CNPE 
retained the authority to propose policies and guidelines for the sector.  
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According to Law 9478/97, oil and natural gas exploration and production 
activities were kept as a State monopoly but with the possibility to be carried out by private 
companies through a concession agreement preceded by a competitive bid, to be promoted by 
ANP. The main features of this concession contract are as follows: i) the area will be awarded in 
a competitive bid to the company which offers the highest signature bonus, exploratory program 
and local content; ii) companies shall be liable for all risks and expenses of operations and, in 
the case of success, are entitled to the property of produced hydrocarbons, subject to 
government participation and taxation; iii) the contract has a maximum duration of 34 years, 
divided into exploration (3 to 8 years and two terms) and production phases; iii) the 
concessionaire must perform the minimum exploration program (PEM) during the exploration 
phase and fulfill with the local content percentage offered in the bid offer. 
The concession contract was based on a royalty tax system, where the law 
9478/97 stated the following taxes: 
- Signature Bonus: value offered by the bid winner company during the auction;  
- Royalty:  fixed fraction of 10% of gross revenue;  
- Special Participation: additional payment due by fields with high production 
volumes. It is calculated by a percentage varying from 10% to 40% of Net 
Income; 
- Area Fee: due annually and based on the area under concession. 
ANP held eleven licensing rounds of exploratory blocks under the concession 
regulatory framework. In the first ten auctions, from 1999 to 2008, 733 concession contracts 
were signed, in a total area of almost 500,000 km2. More than US$2.6 billion was collected as a 
signature bonus and more than US$2.5 billion of exploration investments were committed. The 
eleventh round was conducted in May 2013 with the offer of 289 blocks in 11 sedimentary 
basins. Offers were made for 142 blocks (100,000 km2), totaling US$1.4 billion in signature 
bonuses and US$3.4 billion of exploration investments.  
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From the period from 1998 to 2011, oil proved reserves increased from 7 billion 
bbl to 15 billion bbl., oil production improved from 1 million bbl/d to 2.1 million bbl/d and US$84 
billion was collected as government revenue. 
3.2  The New Regulatory Framework of the Pre-salt Area 
In November 2007, one important event, the discovery of the Tupi field, 
confirmed the potential of the oil reserves in the pre-salt area and awakened the government to 
the necessity of a special treatment of this natural resource deposit.  
The pre-salt area extends over 150,000 square kilometers (60,000 square miles), 
in a water depth between 800 and 3000 meters (2,600 to 9,800 feet) and has sediments 
between 3,000 to 4,000 meters (9,800 to 13,100 feet) thick. Initial tests showed a large amount 
of high quality oil. The exploratory risk in this area is considered relatively low because the layer 
of salt formed almost a perfect trap for the oil formed in the rocks below. The overall estimated 
recovery resource in the area exceeds the level of tens of billions of barrels, being considered 
the “the world’s biggest crude discoveries this century”4.  
For this reason, the Brazilian government created a special commission 
responsible for proposing a new regulation specific to this area. In December of 2010, the 
Brazilian Congress approved, and the president signed, the new rules for oil and gas 
exploration and production in the pre-salt area, Law 12351/10. 
The objectives of the government with this new regulation were to increase the 
government's share of the profit from the projects, expand overall production, stimulate the 
national petroleum industry and create jobs with new investments in the sector. 
The most significant changes of this new framework were: (i) alteration from a 
royalty-tax concession contract to a PSA for future licenses in the pre-salt; (ii) designation of 
Petrobras as sole operator under the PSA; (iii) creation of the Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A – PPSA, to 
                                               
4
 Source: Bloomberg – “Brazil Prepares to Surprise Drillers This Time With Gas”. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/brazil-prepares-to-surprise-drillers-this-time-with-gas.html. 
Download at: 03/23/2013. 
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work as the government representative in the PSA, and; (iv) the establishment of a sovereign 
fund to invest future revenues from resources production. 
Other important features established by Law 12351/10 are i) the offered area will 
be awarded to the company that offers the highest share of Profit Oil to the government; ii) all 
cost and investments during the contract must be supported by the contractors, which can be 
recovered through Cost Oil; iii) the limits and conditions for the calculation of the Cost Oil and 
the parameters for the division of the Profit Oil will be defined by each contract; iv) in addition to 
the state share of Profit Oil, companies are also subjected to the payment of royalties, signature 
bonus and other corporate tax; and iv) the maximum duration of the contract is 35 years. 
The Brazilian government recently announced the intention to conduct the first 
auction under the PSA in the second semester of 2013 for a prospect known as Libra, 
discovered by the ANP well 2-ANP-0002A-RJS. Different from the areas offered under the 
concession regime, where the exploratory risk is a significant issue, the pre-salt area 
demonstrated a high success rate in the wells previously drilled. In addition, it is expected that 
the government will keep a policy to perform exploration activities and offer discovered 
undeveloped field on future auction. 
This last point is of substantial importance in this research because the model 
developed evaluates the impact of the fiscal system under the assumption of a discovered and 
undeveloped area.  
This section has shown that the Brazilian government changed the tax system for 
the new contracts to be signed in the pre-salt area from a royalty concession contract to a PSA.  
Moreover, the new regulatory framework did not establish any specific design among the 
several different arrangements observed in the petroleum industry. The next section will 
introduce basic concepts of a PSA and some examples of the use of this fiscal system at 
petroleum producing countries. 
3.3  Production-Sharing Agreement 
The first PSA was created in Indonesia in 1960 and since then has become one 
of the standard forms of contract between governments of producing countries and international 
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oil companies (IOC), with great spread in Asia and Africa. In the PSA’s basic structure, 
companies are entitled to the right to perform activities of exploration at their own risk, and in the 
case of a commercial discovery, they receive a share of the production corresponding to the 
recovery of incurred cost and investments and a share of the remaining production as a reward 
to the risk. Figure 1.1 shows the basic structure of a royalty-based PSA. 
 
1  Figure 1.1 Basic structure of PSA fiscal system 
The main characteristic of this kind of contract is that, in contrast to the royalty-
tax concession agreements where the produced hydrocarbon belongs to the company, the 
ownership of the produced oil in the PSA belongs to the government and the companies only 
have the title of the production allocated to them as cost recovery and profit oil share (Johnston, 
1994). From a financial point of view, the most important aspects of the PSA system are how 
the costs and investments are recovered and how the profit oil is shared between the 
government and the company.  
Cost recovery is an important issue in project feasibility. In the case of successful 
exploration that results in development and production, the contractor is entitled to recover the 
exploration, appraisal, development, operational and abandonment costs and investments 
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related to the field or the ring fence area. Most contracts around the world set a limit percentage 
on the gross production that can be allocated to cost recovery. 
In the calculation of the cost oil, operational cost is normally recovered in the 
period of expenses and exploration and capital costs are usually depreciated with different 
schedules (straight line, unit of production, escalated with production, MACRS, etc.). 
Abandonment cost can be provisioned during the production phase to be conducted after the 
end of production.  Cost not recovered in the period is generally carried forward for the next 
period, sometimes with an up-lift. Interest payment and cost of financing are usually not 
recoverable (Nakhle, 2010). 
Profit oil, the production after royalty and cost recovery are deducted, is shared 
between government and the company by different methods. In the fixed method, the profit oil is 
shared with a constant percentage rate during the entire production phase, as in the first PSA 
contracts. However, several PSA fiscal systems are based on incremental sliding scale 
methods. The sliding scale share can be based on the level of the production (current or 
cumulative) or alternative measures of profitability, for example the R-factor system. 
It is also common that PSAs have other specific tax provisions, such as royalties 
and bonuses, and in most cases, companies still have to pay income tax at the corporate level. 
Production-sharing fiscal systems with differing designs are found in different 
countries. A fixed percentage model is currently observed in Indonesia and East Timor. A sliding 
scale with cumulative production has been adopted by Angola and Equatorial Guinea. A sliding 
scale with current production is observed in Indonesia, Egypt, Liberia, China and Syria. A sliding 
scale with current production and oil price is in use in Trinidad & Tobago and Uruguay, while the 
R-factor model is observed in Nigeria, Algeria and Libya. 
This chapter has discussed the recent change in the fiscal system in Brazil to a 
production-sharing system as well as the basic concepts and examples of a PSA. The following 
chapter introduces the model developed to capture the host government objective, how 
companies react to different PSA fiscal system designs, and the uncertainties to which the 
project is subjected.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE MODEL 
 
The model developed in this research is described in this chapter in five sections. 
The first one reviews the main features related to the theory behind the evaluation method used 
in the model, which is the modern asset pricing approach. The second section presents the 
overall concept of fields with sequential modular development. The third section presents the 
government utility function, the decision parameters available to set the fiscal systems and how 
those taxes are calculated. The fourth section describes the investors’ utility and behavior 
model. The uncertainties related to the project are defined in the last section of this chapter. 
Because taxes are normally collected at some specific frequency, the model will 
be set in annualized discrete time. This discretization is also important to be able to use the 
Monte Carlo simulation of the spreadsheet. 
4.1  The Real Option Approach 
Since its start, the Real Option approach has found the valuation of natural 
resources assets as one of its prime applications (Siegel, Smith & Paddock, 1987; Brennan & 
Schwartz, 1985). Important characteristics of these industries, such as the long duration of 
production over several periods, the high volatility in the output price, and the presence of 
several operational flexibilities made the problems with traditional DCF more visible in these 
sectors (Jacoby & Laughton, 1992). In addition, the availability of traded commodity prices and 
future markets facilitated the use of market based information in the asset RO valuation of these 
markets (Schwartz & Trigeorgis, 2004).  
In a series of papers5  Laughton (1998a), Salahor (1998), Bradley (1998), 
Laughton (1998b), Baker, Mayfield & Parsons (1998) and Laughton (1998c) reviewed the key 
ideas for the use of Modern Asset Pricing methods for analyzing upstream petroleum projects. 
The four main ideas were: i) a project can be valued by the cash flow valued according to its 
                                               
5
 Publisher by The Energy Journal (1998), volume 19(1). 
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timing and risk; ii) by the principles of value consistency (non-arbitrage) and value additivity, 
where individual cash flows can be added to estimate the overall project value; iii) the future can 
be represented by a tree-like of possible scenarios, and; iv) these tree-scenarios should be 
used in the search for the optimal operational flexibility. 
Those ideas were developed in response to the inefficiency of the DCF methods 
to produce accurate valuations in the presence of uncertainty and management flexibility. The 
most recognized weaknesses with the DCF are how to define the expected cash flows for the 
project, how to define a single discount rate to account for risk and time and the inability to 
evaluate operational flexibility (Myers, 2004). These flaws lead to some important biases, such 
as the underestimate of the value of long-term projects, overestimate of the importance of 
productive capacity to increase the short-term production, undervalue of future cost, 
underestimate of tax liabilities and lack of account for the value of operational flexibility 
(Laughton, 1998a). 
The real option method brought solutions to most of these problems by 
incorporating two new elements: operational flexibility and risk adjustment at source. The first 
adds substantial value to the asset by increasing the upside potential and limiting the losses 
through the introduction of skewness to the value distribution. Some of the flexibilities that can 
be assessed by this technique are the option to defer the investment, the time to build in staged 
investment, the option on the installed capacity and further expansions, the option to abandon 
and several interacting options (Trigeorgis, 2004; Trigeorgis & Mason, 2004). 
The second component of the real option approach separates the adjustment for 
risk in a two-step process. At the beginning, a risk adjustment is applied individually to each 
source of risk in the cash flow. Then those risk-adjusted cash flows are discounted for time 
using the risk-free rate and are summed to determine the asset value (Samis el all, 2006).  
There are two different kinds of risk associated with a project. On one side, 
project-specific risk (unsystematic risk), which is not correlated with the macroeconomic state, 
can be canceled by the actions of well diversified investors and should not be adjusted for risk in 
the project value calculation (Laughton, 1998b). On the other side, systematic risk is the risk 
that will affect all economic activities. It is not diversifiable and should receive an appropriate 
23 
 
risk discount. The main source of systematic risk in natural resource valuation is the commodity 
price. 
Fortunately, for most commodity-based projects, a future market for prices exists, 
and those future prices can be used as the risk-adjusted price expectation (Bradley, 1998; 
Jacoby and Laughton, 1992; Schwartz & Trieorgis, 2004). This hypothesis relies on the 
assumption of value consistency, which is that the financial market is perfect and complete. 
Thus, using certainty equivalent prices, the estimated risk-adjusted cash flows only need to be 
adjusted for time using the risk-free rate (Samis et al, 2006). 
Another important procedure that is not exclusive to the real option approach is 
the use of simulation to account for nonlinearity in the cash flow. A common method used in 
project stochastic simulations is the Monte Carlo. This method considers each uncertain 
variable as a probability distribution and runs several trials of the project cash flow switching 
stochastic values for the variables that reflect the associate distribution. The final output is a 
distribution of the value of the asset. 
There are several reasons why simulation methods should be used in project 
valuation: it is necessary due to variability in project life, skewed outcomes, interdependencies 
among inputs and nonlinearity derived from path-dependence consequential of loss carry-
forward or tax sliding scales (Samis, Davis & Laughton, 2007; Lewellen & Long, 1972). The 
problem arises from the Jensen’s inequality, defined by Samis, Davis & Laughton, 2007 as: 
“This inequality states that an expected value of a strictly concave (convex) function calculated 
with the expected value of an uncertain variable X is greater than (less than) the expected value 
of a strictly concave (convex) function evaluated at a number of certain variable outcomes.” 
It is important to observe that simulations do not reduce or remove the risk of a 
project; they only show the possible range of outcomes of the project value, which helps 
decision makers to understand the riskiness of the project. Because of that, when the Monte 
Carlo simulation is applied in asset valuation, it is still necessary to apply a risk-adjustment on 




4.2 Project Development Concept 
This research examines the distortionary effect of a fiscal system over a 
discovered and undeveloped oil project. It looks especially to the new regulatory framework of a 
PSA in Brazil. For this reason, the basic development concept will cover the characteristic of the 
prospects in the area. 
The fields in the pre-salt are characterized by a large amount of oil in place 
extended through a vast area. Because of that, it is supposed that the fields in this area must be 
developed by sequential modular development. Modular development means that companies 
will have to install independent modules of production to exploit the oil from different areas of 
the field. Sequential means that the development is constrained by the assumption that the 
modules of production must be installed with a minimum difference of one year between the 
installations and start of production of each one. 
In addition, it is assumed that the project is related to a discovered undeveloped 
oil field which will not demand extra exploration activities, so the project simulation will start at 
the development and production phase, which will occur simultaneously. 
Early studies about the development plans in the area assumed the use of 
standard Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) that also includes facilities for gas 
re-injection, where all gas produced will be re-injected to increase the production flow pressure 
and the ultimate recovery rate and that is the standard method used in the model. 
4.3 Government Utility and Decision Variables 
The main objectives of host governments in designing a fiscal system are to 
obtain a fair share of the project profits without discouraging investment. The Brazilian 
government also had various objectives when it decided to change the regulatory framework for 
petroleum exploration in the pre-salt area. Besides increasing the government’s share of a 
project’s profit, the government also aimed to expand production and exports, increase 
investments, promote local industry and create jobs. These objectives are conflicting in the 
sense that by increasing their participation in the project profitability the government reduces the 
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attractiveness of the project to investors. In turn, this may lead to a reduction in investment, 
production, economic activity and job creation. 
To measure these contradictory objectives, the government utility was set as a 
Cobb-Douglas function6 of the expected present value of the government revenue -  
and the expected percentage of the recovery reserves that were produced at the end of the 
contract -. The latter is a proxy for expand production and exports, increase 
investments, promote local industry and create jobs. The model allows the government to set 
four static decisions in the design of the fiscal system before the signature of the contract, at 
time zero. These decisions are taken based on the expected value of the utility parameters. 
Moreover, these expected values are functions of the governments’ decisions, the expected 
firms’ reactions to the fiscal system and the expectations over the project uncertainties.  
The government utility is represented by the equation (4.1) below: 
,,,,, ,!,"#$%& = ∝ ∗ )*+,-, (4.1) 
where:  = ./	0	12.		1.	34	5	6.	4,  = ./	0	12.		12.6	5	..3	273		1	42	, 8 = 	6.	4./3/.9	:/6ℎ.	5	<, )1 − 8- 	= 	6.	4./3/.9	:/6ℎ.	5	<. 
 
The decisions available to the government to define the fiscal system at time 
zero are:  






ρ,V → 3/	/6	23	 − 52.; 
 	
                                               
6
 A Cobb-Douglas utility function guarantees that the two objectives are imperfect substitutes. 
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ii) τ,X 	= 	initial	percentage	of	government	share, decided	at	time	zero	)j	 = 	1, … , 9-,	
where: 
τ,* → //./3	12.6 = 10%, 
τ,S → //./3	12.6 = 20%, 
… 
τ,] → //./3	12.6 = 90%; 
 
iii) θ,^ 	= 	cost	recovery	percentage	limit, decided	at	time	zero	)m	 = 	1,2-,	
where: 
θ,* → 	3//.	5	2.	29	 → 	θ,* = 100%,	
θ,S → 50%	3//.	5	2.	29	 → 	θ,S = 50%, and; 	
iv) γ,` 	= 	cost	recovery	schedule	for	CAPEX, decided	at	time	zero	)n = 1,2-,	
where: 
γ,* → ghi	29	/	1		, 
γ,S → ghi	24	79	./6ℎ.	3/	20	9	2ℎ	43	. 
 
The first source of government utility is the expected present value of 
government revenues - )-, calculated as the expected sum of all taxes collected over 
the contract length. In the model, government revenue is composed by the following taxes:  a 
constant signature bonus (j), royalty (9k)Ωk-), government share of profit oil 
(m/3k)Ωk-) and corporate tax (g1k)nk-), as shown in the equation (4.2): 
)- = j + ∑ )9k)Ωk-- + )m/3k)Ωk--qkr + )g1k)Ωk-- ∗ +stk, (4.2)  
where: j = 	.//./2	/6.4	74,	9k)nk- = 		93.9		.	./	.,	m/3k)nk- = 	6.	15/.	/3		.	./	.,	g1k)nk- = 	21.	.	.	./	..			
The state variable at time t (Ωu) reflects the interaction of government decisions 
at time zero (ρ,?	, τ,X	,θ,^	, γ,`), companies’ decisions at time zero (n,v	, q,v- and at time t (su,v- 
and the project’s uncertainties (pxu, yv, CI{ u), as shown in Appendix F. 
The second source of government utility is the expected percentage of total 
recoverable reserves produced at the end of the contract, as shown in equation (4.3). In this 
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equation the denominator represents the sum of physically recoverable reserves of each 
module of production and the numerator total production during the project life. 
EPerRes = 	∑ }k)Ωk-qkr∑ y~~r* , (4.3)  
where:  }k)Ωk- = ..3	1	42./	5	.ℎ	5/3	, .	./	., y~ = 1ℎ9/2339	273		5	2ℎ	m	)5 = 1,… ,-.		
The model considers the signature bonus, the royalty rate and the corporate tax 
rate as being fixed, while the government is able to change the structure of the fiscal system 
related to the PSA: the government share of profit oil, the initial percentage of government profit 
oil share, the cost recovery percentage limit and the cost recovery schedule for capital cost. 
The signature bonus (j) is the amount paid by the companies before the 
signature of the contract. According to Law 12351/10, the signature bonus value will be a fixed 
amount defined before the auction, and it is not recovered through the Cost Recovery.  
Royalty (9k)Ωk-) is defined as a financial compensation for the production of 
hydrocarbons to be divided between the states, municipalities and the federal government. 
Royalty is paid monthly as a fixed percentage (∅) of the gross revenue (k)Ωk-). Law 
12,351/10 prohibits the inclusion of the royalty in the Cost Oil. 
 9k)Ωk- = ∅ ∗ k)Ωk-, (4.4) 
 
where:  ∅ = 93.9	.	)%-, k)Ωk- = 6	4, .	./	.	, and 
 
 k)Ωk- = 	1k ∗	}k)Ωk-, (4.5) 
 
where: 1k = /43.		/		4.		/3	1.	1/2	.	./	. − 4./	4.45,	}k)Ωk- = total	production	of	field, at	time	t. 
 
Companies are also subjected to corporate tax (g1k)nk-). It is collected 
over the Net Income and has some provision for the compensation of past loss. Because of its 
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structure, it is the first source of nonlinearity in the cash flow, demanding the use of simulation to 
avoid the Jensen Inequality. The corporate tax is collected directly by the federal government, 
and has a very complex calculation, with different schedules for the depreciation of diverse 
elements of the capital expenditures. This model considers a simplified model for the corporate 
tax, described through equations (4.6) to (4.9). Equations for the deduction of depreciation of 
CAPEX, OPEX and provision of ABEX are described at Appendix F. 
 g1k)nk- = 	{0,  ∗ g7k)nk- −	g1k)nk-, (4.6) 
g7k)nk- = 	k)nk- − )jk + 9k)nk- 	+ m/3k)nk- + ghik)nk- +	mik)nk- + hjik)nk--, (4.7) 
 g1k)nk- = /	{g4k+*)nk-	, 0.3 ∗ g7k)nk-}, and (4.8) 
 g4k)nk- = 	k)nk- + 	g4k+*)nk- − g1k+*)nk-, (4.9) 
where:  = 21.	.	.	)%-, g7k)Ωk- = 21.	.	7, .	./	., g1k)nk- = 3	.	21., .	./	., g4k)nk- = 2443./	3, .	./	., k)nk- = 3, .	./	., m/3k)nk- = 6.	15/.	/3	4, .	./	., ghik)nk- = 	12/./	5	21/.3	2., .	./	., mik)nk- = 1./3	2., .	./	., hjik)nk- = 1//	5	7	.	2., .	./	.. 
 
The final source of government revenue, the government share of Profit Oil 
(m/3k)Ωk-), is the most important to be investigated in this research. The Profit Oil 
(m/3k)Ωk-) is defined as the amount of the production to be shared between the government 
and the contractors, according to the rules set by the contract, calculated as the difference 
between the total production and the portion relative to the cost recovery in the period. 
Different from the royalty and the corporate tax, where the calculation methods, 
the percentage of tax and the allowed deductions are set by a strict regulation, Law 12,351/10 
was approved without a detailed specification of important parameters of the production-sharing 
fiscal system. This gave extra flexibility to the government to set this parameter according to the 
fiscal needs at the time of the auction and the geological characteristics of the offered area.  
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At this point, the focus will be on the description of the government Profit Oil 
share, but first it is important to define the Cost Recovery (g.2k)Ωk-. The Cost Recovery is 
the share of the production due to the contractors in compensation for the amount of investment 
and costs in the activities of exploration, development, production and abandonment, subjected 
to the limits and recovery schedules stated in the contract. The Cost Recovery calculation is 
described by equations (4.10) to (4.13): 
 g.2k)Ωk- = min	{	g.//.k)Ωk-, g.2k)Ωk-}, (4.10) 
 g.//.k)Ωk- = 	k)Ωk- ∗ )1 − ∅- ∗ ,, (4.11) 
g.2k)Ωk- =
γ,`ghik)Ωk- + mik)Ωk- +	hjik)Ωk- +	g..2k+*)Ωk-,and (4.12) 
 g..2k)Ωk- = g.2k)Ωk- −	g.2k)Ωk-, (4.13) 
 
where:  g.2k)Ωk- = 4.	5	1	42./	.	7	332.			g.	29, .	./	.	, g.//.k)Ωk- = 	6	4	33:		.	7	4			g.	29, .	./	.	, g.2k)Ωk- = ..3	2.	.	7	2	, .	./	.	, g..2k)Ωk- = 2.	.	7	2		.ℎ.	2		.ℎ	g.	2	3//., .	./	.	, 
γ,`ghik)Ωk- = ghi	5	2.	29, .	./	., mik)Ωk- = 1./3	2., .	./	.	, hjik)Ωk- = 1//	5	7	.	2., .	./	.. 
 
After the calculation of the Cost Recovery at period t, the Profit Oil is the 
difference between the gross revenue less royalty minus the amount of cost recovered at the 
period. That amount is shared between the government and the contractor at the correspondent 
rate at the period. Because the share of profit oil due to the company is only available in the 
case of positive profit oil, it is the second source of nonlinearity in the cash flow. 
 m/3k)Ωk- = Γ,k ∗ m/3k)Ωk-, (4.14) 
 gm/3k)Ωk- = )1 − Γ,k- ∗ m/3k)Ωk-, and (4.15) 
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 m/3k)Ωk- = max		{0, )k)Ωk--)1 − ∅- − g.2k)Ωk-}, (4.16) 
where: m/3k)Ωk- = 6.	ℎ	5	15/.	/3, .	./	., gm/3k)Ωk- = 219	ℎ	5	15/.	/3, .	./	., m/3k)Ωk- = ..3	15/.	/3, .	./	., k)Ωk- = 6	4, .	./	., Γ,k)Ωk- = 6.	12.6	5	15/.	/3, .	./	.	) = /-. 
 
The model allows for the comparison of five different ways of the government to 
set the profit oil share. The first is based on a fixed rate of the profit oil to be allocated to the 
government. The other three are based on a sliding scale percentage that can be set to vary 
according to production. These are based on: i) cumulative production; ii) current production 
rate, and  iii) current production rate and current price. The final one is based on a measure of 
profitability typically adopted in a PSA, the R-Factor, which is calculated as the ratio of the 
cumulative revenue over the cumulative cost. 
Γ*,k = 	5/	12.6 = 	 ,*, 
 ΓS,k = 3/		23	12.6	:/.ℎ	2443./	1	42./	.	9	. 							= 5,S	, ∑ })Ωk-kr , 
 ΓT,k = 3/		23	12.6	:/.ℎ	24.	1	42./	.	9	. 									= 5T	, }k)Ωk-, 
 ΓU,k = 3/		23	12.6	:/.ℎ	24.	1	42./			1/2	.	9	. 								= 5,U	, }k)Ωk-	, 1k, and 
 ΓV,k = 3/		23	12.6	7			 − 52.	./	.	9	. 								= 5,V	, ∑ )Ωk-kr , ∑ gg.)Ωk-kr , 
 




The functions above represent generalizations of these five possible production-
sharing fiscal system designs; in section 5.8, the specific parameters adopted in the 
optimizations are displayed. 
This section has revealed the decision available to the host government to set a 
production-sharing fiscal system. The investors’ objective and range of possible reactions are 
described next. 
4.4  Contractors Utility, Decision Variables and the Production Curve 
Companies will make their investment decisions and set their production profiles 
in order to maximize their profits given the tax system and other regulatory provisions. For this 
reason, the way that the government sets the fiscal terms of the PSA will determine if the field 
will be developed or not, the optimal time path for the development, the total installed capacity, 
the speed of production and how much oil will be left in the ground.  
The model considers that the contractors have the sole objective to maximize the 
expected present value of its profit. Companies respond to the fiscal system provisions by 
adjusting the decisions over the year of installation, the capacity size and the abandonment date 
of each module of production. The first two decisions are made at year zero, according to the 
firms’ expectation relative to the project value, while the abandonment decision is made 
dynamically at each period. As in the government utility function, expectations are a function of 
the government decisions, the firm’s own decision and the expectations over the project 
uncertainties. 
Company utility is described in equation (4.17), below: 
,,,,t,#% =∑ )g.2k)Ωk-- + )gm/3k)Ωk-- 	− ))ghik)Ωk-- + )mik)Ωk-- +qkr )hjik)Ωk-- + )g1k)Ωk--	-	 ∗ +stk, 
 
(4.17) 
where: g.2k)nk- = g.	29, .	./	.,	gm/3k)nk- = 219	ℎ	5	15/.	/3, .	./	.,	ghik)nk- = 21/.3	2., .	./	.,	
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mik)nk- = 1./3	2., .	./	.,	hjik)nk- = 1//	5	7	.	2., .	./	.,	g1k)nk- = 		21.	., .	./	.,	k = /	5	., .	./	.,	 = ./3	1/		5	2.2..		
The behavioral model to measure the reaction of the contractor to the tax system 
allows the operator to maximize its utility over three decision parameters, which are: 
i- ,~ 	= 	.ℎ	9	5	/.33./	5	2ℎ	m, decided	at	time	zero	)5 =
1,… ,-,	
where: 0 ≥ ,~ ≥ T, ,~ < ,~ *,  = 47	5		43	5	1	42./	.	7	/.33		/	.ℎ	5/3	; 	ii- ,~ 	= 1	42./	212/.9	5	2ℎ	m, 	2/			.	./	0		)5 = 1,… , -,	
where: 100,000 ≥ ,~ ≥ 175,000	7,	and 	iii- k,~ 	= 	.ℎ	9	5	7	.	5	2ℎ	m, 	2/			.	./	.	)5 =
1,… ,-,	
where: ,~ + 2	 ≥ k,~ ≥ T. 
 
4.4.1  Timing Decision 
The first decision parameter that describes the company behavioral response in 
the model is the optimal period to make the investment and start the production of each FPSO. 
This decision is made at time zero based on the expectations over the project inputs and 
outputs, which are functions of the initial parameters set by the government, the reaction of the 
firms and the project uncertainties. 
The Real Option approach considers the value of an undeveloped oil field as a 
call option to invest, which means that the company has the right but not the obligation to 
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exercise the option to invest in the development of the field in order to receive the future cash 
flows from the production. The conceptual development plan of the field considers the 
installation of sequential multiple modules of production, which bring an additional flexibility to 
the operator, to delay not only the start of the production, but also the installation of each FPSO, 
or even to decide to not exercise the option to invest in some of them, in order to maximize its 
return. 
4.4.2  Production Capacity Decision and Production Curve 
The second parameter available to companies to change in response to the fiscal 
system is the production capacity of each FPSO. The model also considers that this decision is 
made at time zero based on expectations over the project inputs and outputs, which are 
functions of the initial parameters set by the government, the reaction of the firms and the 
project uncertainties. 
The decision over the production capacity will have direct influence on the project 
investments and costs, the production profile and the total volume produced. Companies will 
face a trade-off between the increase in the production capacity and the investments necessary 
to build those facilities and the operational costs to maintain the production. 
As do most of the studies of the distortion effects of taxation in the petroleum 
industry, the model assumes an exponential decline rate for the production of each FPSO, 
where the production capacity ),~- is equivalent to the initial production. The production path 
depends on the capacity chosen and the random decline (x), functions of the recovery rate 
uncertainty. The random production of each module of production)xk,~- will follow the equation 
(4.18). 
 xk,~ = ,~+¢xk, (4.18) 
where: xk,~ = 		1	4./	5	m, .	./	.	)5 = 1,… ,-,	,~ = 5/		1	42./	212/.9		5	m, 	2/	2	.	./	0	)5 = 1,… , -,	x~ = 			23/	.	5	m	)5 = 1,… ,-.		
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The random total volume of reserves to be physically recovered by each FPSO )y~- is dependent on the uncertain recovery rate (~), described in the section 4.5.3, but the 
company is assumed to make the production capacity decision before recovery rate is revealed, 
which defines the decline rate. The recoverable reserve can be estimated by integrating 
equation (4.18) 
 y~ = 	£ xk,~¤ 	. = 	£ ,~+¢xk¤ 	. = 	 ,¢x . (4.19) 
So, the decline rate x~ is revealed by the decision on the production capacity and 
the uncertain recoverable reserve  
 x~ = ,¥y . (4.20) 
Finally, the random total production of the field )}yk- is the sum of the individual 
FPSO productions: 
 }yk)Ωk- = ∑ xk,~)Ωk-qkr . (4.21) 
4.4.3  Abandonment Decision 
The last decision parameter available to the company to maximize its utility is the 
abandonment timing of each FPSO and the shut-down of the entire field. The model has a 
dynamic trigger that will set the abandonment of the module of production when the economic 
limit is achieved. The economic limit was set according to the definition of the Petroleum 
Resource Management System (PRMS, 2008) below. In the year that all units of production had 
achieved the economic limit, the entire field is abandoned. 
“Economic limit is defined as the production rate, beyond which the 
net operating cash flows from a project, which may be an individual well, lease, or 
entire field, are negative, a point in time that defines the project’s economic life. 
Operating costs should be based on the same type of projections as used in price 
forecasting. Operating costs should include only those costs that are incremental to 
the project for which the economic limit is being calculated (i.e., only those cash costs 
that will actually be eliminated if project production ceases should be considered in 
the calculation of economic limit). Operating costs should be based on the same type 
of projections as used in price forecasting. Operating costs should include only those 
costs that are incremental to the project for which the economic limit is being 
calculated (i.e., only those cash costs that will actually be eliminated if project 
production ceases should be considered in the calculation of economic limit). 
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Operating costs should include fixed property-specific overhead charges if these are 
actual incremental costs attributable to the project and any production and property 
taxes but, for purposes of calculating economic limit, should exclude depreciation, 
abandonment and reclamation costs, and income tax, as well as any overhead above 
that required to operate the subject property itself.” 
 
This method is of standard use in the petroleum industry, but the outcome is 
possibly suboptimal since this approach considers only past information to make a decision. A 
more elaborated approach would include expectation over the cash flow of future periods and 
demand other analysis methods, such as backward induction. 
The logical trigger set to the model is: 
¦5	m1g)k+*-)Ωk- §≥ 0, k,~)Ωk- = )k+*-,~)Ωk- ∗ +¢k< 0, 0 , 
where m1g)k+*-)nk- = .	1./6	2ℎ	53:			5/		79	¨	)2008-, .	./	..	
 
The year of abandonment (k,~) of each module of production is limited to occur 
with a minimum 2 years after the installation of the FPSO (,~), and must happen before the 
end of the contract (T), or ,~ + 2	 ≥ k,~ ≥ T. This assumption was made to allow that negative 
cash flows derived from the large amount of capital expenses (CAPEX) in the year of installation 
of the module of production do not activate the abandonment trigger. This 2 years moratorium in 
the abandonment trigger could be extended to guarantee a minimum production period in which 
the production will be continued even if it creates losses to the operator. However, it will be 
shown in section 6.1 that the change in the model output is minimal under this modification. 
Having presented the government and investor’s objective functions and 
decisions parameters, the next section will introduce the uncertainties considered in the model. 
4.5 Uncertainties 
The model considers four sources of uncertainty related to the project. The 
uncertainties related to the stochastic price movement are the principal risk associated with any 
commodity-related project, and are presented in the first section. Cost escalation and recovery 
rate are the other sources of uncertainty incorporated into the model and are also described. 
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4.5.1  Two-factor Stochastic Process 
The sophistication of the method used to model the stochastic process of oil 
prices is an important element in the valuation analysis. The RO approach focuses attention on 
that, and several approaches have been developed to model commodity price dynamics. 
The most commonly used method to model commodity prices is the permanent 
shock model, or the random walk with drift. This model has the advantage of simplicity of the 
parameters estimation, but the drawbacks are the extreme dependency of the time period 
chosen in the estimation and the increase in the volatility over time. Empirical tests have shown 
that the random walk hypothesis is rejected for oil and cooper prices, so the reversion model 
has been given more attention in recent studies (Baker et al., 1998). This model relies on 
market forces to keep the price close to an equilibrium level, taking into account the fluctuations 
of the short-run prices and the speed of adjustment to long-run trends. The estimation of 
parameters in this model is still simple, and one important characteristic is that the volatility is 
constant over time  
In addition to the simple one-factor reversion model, Schwartz (1997) displayed 
commodity price movement with two and three factors models, incorporating stochastic 
convenience yield and stochastic interest rates. His empirical analysis showed that the one-
factor model is not adequate to describe the data for oil and cooper price, and the two-factor 
model outperform the three-factor for oil data. 
This research assumes that oil price follows the two factor stochastic process as 
proposed by Schwartz and Smith (2000). In this model, uncertainty is composed of two 
stochastic elements: i) the short-run deviations around steady-state equilibrium price, and ii) the 
long-run equilibrium price. 
The short-run deviation corresponds to the differences between the spot price 
and the equilibrium price related to temporary disequilibrium in the market supply and demand 
due to transitory excess in consumption or shortage in production. The disequilibrium will induce 
producers and consumers entry and exit which will lead the short-run deviations to revert toward 
zero over time following an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Davis, 2012). 
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The long-run equilibrium price is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion 
with drift that reflects expectations about market fundamentals that may include inflation, 
discovery of new producing areas, exhaustion of existing fields, improving technology, and 
political and regulatory changes, etc. (Schwartz & Smith, 2000). 
This stochastic price model is a variation of the two-factor model proposed by 
Gibson and Schwartz (1990), where the stochastic parameters convenience yield and the spot 
price are suppressed in favor of the short-run deviation and the long-term equilibrium, concepts 
that are easier to understand outside the financial market. 
The two-factor stochastic process can be described as follows: assuming that the 
oil spot price (St) has a lognormal distribution, it can be divided into two stochastic factors:   ln)k- = 	ªk +	«k  where ªkrepresent the short-run deviation and «k is the equilibrium log price, 
both normally distributed. Because ln)k-	is the sum of two normally distributed stochastic 
variables, it also has a normal distribution. 
The short-run deviations (ªk- are expected to revert toward zero over time 
according to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process as 
 dχu =	−kχudt + σ¯dz¯. (4.22) 
The long-run equilibrium («k) follows a Geometric Brownian motion process 
 dξu = μ²dt + σ²dz². (4.23) 
The model considers that the stochastic element of equations (4.22) and (4.23) 
are correlated with 
 dz¯dz² = ρ¯²dt . (4.24) 







k Short-run mean reversion coefficient 
σχ Short-run volatility 
dzχ Short-run process increments 
µξ Equilibrium drift rate 
σξ Equilibrium volatility 
dzξ Equilibrium process increments 
ρχξ Correlation in increments 
1Table 4.1 Two-factor stochastic process parameters 
Given ª	and «, as the initial state variables, Schwartz and Smith (2000) found 
analytical forms for the normal distribution of those state variables as 
 Eχu, ξu = 	 ´e+µuχ, ξ + μ²t¶ (4.25) 
and 
 Covχu, ξu = 	 · )1 − e+Sµu- ¸¹
º
Sµ )1 − e+µu- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ)1 − e+µu- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ σ²St ½. (4.26) 
So the log of future spot price will be a normal distribution with 
 Eln	)Su- = Eχu + ξu = Eχu + 	Eξu,  
 Eln	)Su- = e+µuχ + ξ + μ²t, and (4.27) 
 Varln	)Su- = 	Varχu + ξu = Varχu + 	Varξu + 2Covχu, ξu,  
 Varln	)Su- = 	 1 − e+Sµu ¸¹ºSµ + σ²St + 2)1 − e+µu- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ . (4.28) 
Finally, the spot price is log-normally distributed with expected value 
 ESu = exp	)Eln)Su- + *S 		Varln)Su--,  
 ln	)ESu- = Eln)Su- + *S 		Varln)Su-, and  
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ln)ESu- = 	 e+µuχ + ξ + μ²t + *SÀ1 − e+Sµu ¸¹ºSµ + σ²St + 2)1 − e+µu- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ Á. (4.29) 
Furthermore, Schwartz and Smith (2000) also developed a risk-neutral process 
used to value future contracts, which will be used in this research to value the oil field project in 
a risk-neutral environment. 
4.5.1.1 Risk-neutral process 
To convert the spot price process into a risk-neutral spot price process, two 
additional parameters, corresponding to the short-run and long-run risk premium, respectively, 
λχ and λξ.  were introduced. The stochastic processes become 
 dχu = )−kχu − λ¯-dt + σ¯dz∗̄, (4.30) 
 
dξu = )μ² − λ²-dt + σ²dz²∗,	and	 (4.30) 
 dz∗̄dz²∗ = ρ¯²dt . (4.31) 
In this new process, the risk-neutral short-run deviation reverts towards	−λχ ⁄ , 
and the risk-neutral drift of the geometric Brownian motion followed by the long-term equilibrium 
is	μ²∗ = μ² − λ². 
Considering again ª	and «, as the initial state variables, the risk-neutral 
expected value for the state variables become 
 E∗χu, ξu = 	 Äe+µuχ − )1 − e+µu- Å¹µ 	 , ξ + μ²∗tÆ, (4.32) 
and the covariance matrix remain the same 
 Cov∗χu, ξu = Covχu, ξu. (4.33) 
Then, the risk-neutral log of future spot price become 
 E∗ln	)Su- = e+µuχ − )1 − e+µu- Å¹µ + ξ + μ²∗t, (4.34) 
and the variance remain the same 
 Var∗ln	)Su- = Varln	)Su-.  
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To define the market value of future contracts with expiration at time T valued at 
time zero, FT,0, Schwartz and Smith (2000) consider that in a risk-neutral framework, expected 
risk-neutral future spot prices are equal to future prices according to following equation: 
 lnFÈ, = ln)E∗SÈ- = E∗ln	)Su- +	*SVar∗ln	)Su-,  
 lnFÈ, = e+µÈχ + ξ + A)T-, (4.35) 
where 
A)T- = μ²∗T	 − 1 − e+µÈ Å¹µ +	*SÀ1 − e+SµÈ ¸¹ºSµ + σ²ST + 2)1 − e+µÈ- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ Á. 
4.5.1.2 Estimating the State Variables and Model Parameters 
The two state variables of the model are not directly observed, but can be 
estimated from spot and/or future contracts. Schwartz and Smith (2000) showed the use of 
Kalman Filtering and “implied estimates” techniques to estimate the state variables and model 
parameters. 
Schwartz and Smith (2000) defined the Kalman filter as “a recursive procedure 
for computing estimates of unobserved state variables based on observations that depend on 
these state variables. Given a prior distribution on the initial value of the state variables and a 
modeling describing the likelihood of the observations as function of the true values, the Kalman 
filter generates updated posterior distributions for these state variables in accordance with 
Bayes’ rule.” 
The short-run deviation (χu) and the long-run equilibrium price (ξu) are the state 
variables, and the log of the price of future contracts are the observations. The transition 
equations define the evolution of the state variables and the measurement equations link the 
state variables with the observed future prices. 
The transition equations, used to updating the state variables, are set as 




 Evu = 0, (4.37) 
 Varvu = CovχÍu, ξÍu, (4.38) 
 CovχÍu, ξÍu = · )1 − e+SµÍu- ¸¹
º
Sµ )1 − e+µÍu- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ)1 − e+µÍu- »¹¼¸¹¸¼µ σ²SΔt ½, (4.39) . = 1,… , .,	. = 	.ℎ	47	5	./	1/		/	.ℎ		.	.,	
∆. = 	.ℎ	36.ℎ	5	.ℎ	./	.1. 	
The measurement equation, which define the connection between the state 
variables and the observed future prices, are set as 
 Îln)FÈ*-…ln)FÈ`-Ï = Î
A)T*-…A)T̀ -Ï + Î
e+µÈÐ 1… …e+µÈÑ 1Ï Ä
χuξuÆ + Î
u*u…u`uÏ, (4.40) 
where the vector uu represent the measurement error, and 
Îu*u…u`uÏ = uu= vector of serially uncorrelated and normally distributed error with 
Euu = 0 and Covuu = R. 
The details of the Kalman filter procedures go beyond the scope of this research, 
but a simplified description is that after defining the transition and measurement equations, the 
initial distributions for the state variables and the observable future contract prices, the Kalman 
Filter starts a recursive process for optimal estimation of the model parameters.  At each period 
the Kalman filter estimates the distribution of the state variables for the following period based 
on the vector of observed variables, the vector of mean state variables and the covariance 
matrix. Then the Kalman Filter uses the error in the state variables estimation to update the 
parameter values until it achieves the maximum likelihood value (Ferraz, 2009). 
In addition to the Kalman Filter technique, Schwartz and Smith (2000) also 
propose an alternative procedure to estimate the state variables and the model parameters. 
This method uses a grid search routine to determine the value of the state variables and the 
model parameters in order to minimize the squared difference between the observed future 
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prices on a given date and the values predicted by equation (4.35). The authors exemplify the 
use of the implied estimates to search the risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate (µξ*) and the mean-
reverting rate (k) to fit the current future price curve.  
4.5.1.3 Discrete Simulation 
As the model is set with one-year steps, it is necessary to discretize the two-
factor stochastic process. Davis (2012) developed an exact discrete process for the risk-
adjusted long-run equilibrium price and the short-run deviation as: 
 h«k Ík = «k∗ + ÒÓ∗Δ. + ÔÓ√Δ.<k, (4.41) 
where 
 «k∗ = «k − Ö×Ø , (4.42)  
and 
 hªk Ík = ªk∗+ØÍk + ÔÙÚ*+ÛÜºÝÞtSØ ßk, (4.43) 
where 
 ªk∗ = ªk + Ö×Ø . (4.44) 
The discrete process for the risk-adjusted spot price is 
h_k Ík = 1«k∗ + ÒÓ∗Δ. + ªk∗+ØÍk ∗ 1 ÀÔÓ√Δ.<k + ÔÙÚ*+ÛÜºÝÞtSØ ßkÁ, (4.45) 
where εt and ωt are the two correlated random draws, with <k~)0,1- and ßk~N)ρ<k, 1 − ρS-. 
The closed form solution for the time zero expectation for the risk adjusted spot 






1ãª∗+Ø)k Ík- + «∗ + äÒÓ∗ + *SÔÓSå )t + Δ.- + *SÀ1 − +SØ)k Ík- æ×ºSØ + 2)1 −
+Ø)k Ík-- ×çæ×æçØ Áè. 
(4.47) 
Davis (2012) defines the time zero expectation for the risk-adjusted effective 
long-run equilibrium price at time t+∆t as 
h	552./		/2k Ík = 	1 ä«∗ + æ×ºUØ + ×çæ×æçØ å x		1 éäÒÓ∗ + *SÔÓSå )t + Δ.-ê. (4.48) 
4.5.2  Cost Escalation 
Cost recovery is an important feature of the production-sharing fiscal systems 
and an important determinant of the project value to be included as a source of uncertainty in 
the model. 
The model assumes that the capital cost (CAPEX), operational cost (OPEX) and 
abandonment cost (ABEX) corresponding to the initial capacity chosen are known at the first 
year of contract, but how those costs fluctuate in the subsequent years are considered as 
indices following a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) stochastic process. This process was 
chosen because of the relative simplicity for parameter estimation with a small amount of data 
available. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the stochastic term of cost escalation is 
correlated with the stochastic movement of short run deviation of prices (ωt). This assumption 
relies on the idea that when ωt is positive, oil prices will be higher than the previous period, 
raising the demand for services and equipment and increasing the cost escalation above the 
trend. 
The GBM process followed by cost escalation is represented by equation (4.49), 
below as 
 
ëìíìí = Ò	. + Ô	0, (4.49) 
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where: g¦ = 2.	/	, Ò = 		/5.	.	5	/3	2.	/	,	Ô = 3./3/.9	5	2.	/	,		0 = 			:.		
In a discrete time, a GBM stochastic process for the index of each cost can be 
simulated with equation (4.50): 
 g¦	). + ∆.- = g¦).- ∗ exp	ÄäÒ − æîºS å ∆. + Ôk√∆.Æ, (4.50) 
where: k = 			:,:ℎ	k~)ïß, 1 − ïS-.		
One important characteristic of the cost escalation uncertainty is that it is 
considered a project-specific uncertainty (unsystematic risk), which is not correlated with the 
overall state of the economy, and could be canceled by the actions of well diversified investors. 
For this reason, there is no necessity for risk adjustment of this uncertainty in the estimation of 
the project value. 
4.5.3  Recovery Rate 
The last uncertain variable incorporated in the model is the recovery rate, which 
represents the percentage of the OOIP that can be physically produced with existing 
technology. The random recovery rate (ð~) of each module of production defines the random 
total volume of reserves to be physically recoverable by each FPSO (y~), the random decline 
rate (equation 4.20) and the random production path of each module of production (equation 
4.18).  
Because the research measures the effects of fiscal systems that are based on 
production (cumulative or current), the recovery rate uncertainty is an important factor to be 
considered by the government when defining the production level in sliding scale systems 
(Johnston, 1994).  
Early studies about the recovery rate at the pre-salt area were conducted with 
limited data and over a short period of production in similar reservoirs and concluded that most 
of the uncertainty about the recovery rate comes from the reaction of the fluid to the water and 
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gas injection. A GCA report (2010) draws a triangular distribution for this uncertainty where the 
minimum value means that “water injection results in no benefit”, the most likely value 
corresponds to “full effect of the rock and fluid expansion plus the full effect of the solution gas 
drive is achieved” and the maximum value considers a “60% volumetric sweep efficiency7.” 
Initial formation tests in the pre-salt area had shown that the reservoirs’ 
structures are comprised by diverse kinds of rocks that are connected between each other but 
can result in different fluid flow characteristics. For that reason, the model also assumes the 
concept of heterogeneous formation8, where the area covered by each FPSO can have a 
different response to the enhanced oil recovery process by water and gas injection. 
The total volume of reserves to be physically recoverable by each FPSO (y~) is 
estimated according to equation (4.51), below: 
 y~ = 	ññíòó ∗ ð~. (4.51) 
The same way as the cost escalation uncertainty, the recovery rate is also a 
project specific uncertainty and should not be risk adjusted if well diversified investors are 
assumed. 
This chapter has described the most important aspects of the model; Appendix F 
has a complete description of the equations necessary to reproduce the model. The next 
chapter presents the parameter estimations, the assumption used in the model simulation and 
also the solution technique applied. 
  
                                               
7 Volumetric sweep efficiency: A measure of the effectiveness of an enhanced oil recovery process that 
depends on the volume of the reservoir contacted by the injected fluid. The volumetric sweep efficiency is 
an overall result that depends on the injection pattern selected, off-pattern wells, fractures in the reservoir, 
position of gas-oil and oil/water contacts, reservoir thickness, permeability and areal and vertical 
heterogeneity, mobility ratio, density difference between the displacing and the displaced fluid, and flow 
rate. Source: http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Terms/v/volumetric_sweep_efficiency.aspx 
 
8 Heterogeneous formation: Formation with rock properties changing with location in the reservoir. Some 





CHAPTER 5  
PARAMETER ESTIMATION, MODEL OPTIMIZATIONS AND SOLUTION TECHNIQUE 
 
This chapter details the parameters of the optimizations performed with the 
model described in the previous chapter. It starts with the field characteristic and estimated 
reserves, the project basic development plan and costs and details of the contract length and 
taxes rates. It next describes the data used to model the uncertain variables in the model, the 
ultimate recovery rate distribution, the estimated parameters of the two-factor stochastic 
process for the price and the estimated parameters of the geometric Brownian motion stochastic 
process for the costs indices. Finally, it defines the range of possible decisions to be made by 
the government and the companies. The last section describes the detail of the optimizations 
and the software used. 
5.1  Field Characteristics and Estimated Original Oil-in-place 
As explained in Chapter 3, the Brazilian government is developing a large 
exploration program in the sedimentary basins across the country. This program includes the 
drilling of exploration wells in the pre-salt area to prove the existence of hydrocarbons and 
estimate the prospect OOIP before the auction. For this reason, this research assumes the 
valuation model of a discovered undeveloped field with a defined estimated OOIP. 
The case study is based on the development plan of a field called Franco. 
Discovered in 2010, by ANP exploration well 2-ANP-1_RJS, this field is located in the south 
coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro, in a water depth of approximately 2000 m and extending 
over more than 400 km2. 
The evaluation report prepared by the certification company Gaffney, Cline & 
Associates (GCA, 2010) concludes that, based on well log data, analogous discoveries and 
prospects information, regional well data, and considering the formation characteristics of 




5.2  Basic Development Plan 
The development plan based on the GCA report (2010) states that the field 
should be developed by modular development concept, demanding the installation of six 
Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) modules of production ( = 6). Each one is 
capable of being connected to wells within a 7 km ratio. All gas produced will be injected in the 
field to increase the recovery pressure.  
Different from the GCA report (2010) that assumes a fixed processing capacity of 
150,000 for each FPSO, in this optimization, the capacity size is one of the decision parameters 
that companies have available to maximize its returns.  
5.3  Initial Cost 
The cost and investments necessary for the development, production and 
abandonment operations of the field are assumed to be known at the first year of the contract 
according to the initial capacity of each FPSO chosen by the field operator. Table 5.1 shows 
those initial costs at each capacity level assumed in the optimization. Those values were based 
on industry reports. 
Initial Capacity 









100 3,050 100 10 350 
125 4,100 125 10 525 
150 5,100 150 10 700 
175 6,050 175 10 875 
2Table 5.1 Cost of capital and operational cost at year 1 
5.4  Contract Length and “Basic Tax” 
Law 12,351/10 considers a maximum contract length of 35 years, which will be 
considered a terminal point after which the field must be abandoned. The optimization also 
assumes that the company will have to pay US$100 million as signature bonus, 15% royalty 
over the gross revenue and a 35% corporate income tax over profits.  
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For corporate tax deductions, the capital cost will be depreciated in a 20-year 
straight line schedule, and operational cost and abandonment provision will be expensed. 
Companies can also deduct from the corporate tax base the amount paid as signature bonus, 
royalty and government share of Profit Oil. Losses can be carried forward to be deducted until a 
limit of 30% of the next period income tax base. These assumptions reflect the framework of the 
current legislation. 
5.5  Recovery Rate Uncertainty 
The previous chapter explained that the uncertainty about the recovery rate 
derives from the reaction of the oil production to the water and gas injection. It has also been 
stated that the model is based on the concept of heterogeneous formation and the random draw 
of the recovery rate (~ð ) will be known to each module of production only after the decision of 
the production capacity and the start of the production. 
The simulation assumes the same triangular distribution of the recovery rate 
estimated by the GCA report (2010), between 10% and 48%, with a most likely value of 26% 
and a mean of 28%. 
 




5.6  Parameter Estimation: Risk-adjusted Oil Price 
The state variables and parameter estimation used in this research was done by 
a two-step procedure with the combination of the two estimation methods described in the 
previous chapter. The observed data used in the estimation was the price of future contract of 
Brent Crude Oil, traded on the Inter-Continental Exchange (Europe), part of the ICE Group, for 
the period from 08/14/2007 to 01/18/2013, collected at Quandl database. 
First, using the “sspace” object of the software Eviews version 7.2, the Kalman 
filter was applied to the daily price of the future contracts of Brent Crude Oil, with maturities of 
1,6,12,18 and 24 months. In Eviews, the state equations (@state) correspond to the transition 
equations (4.36), and their respective variance and covariance. The signal equations (@signal) 
correspond to the measurement equation (4.40) for the 5 maturities selected. After 54 iterations 
Eviews found the set of parameter estimation with highest log likelihood (24,893.08), as shown 
in Figure 5.2. 
 
3 Figure 5.2 Two-factor parameter estimation with Kalman filter (sspace space Eviews) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Short-run mean reversion coefficient C(1) 0.5108 0.0047 109.7957 0.0000
Short-run volatility C(2) 0.2606 0.0055 47.6574 0.0000
Short-run risk premium C(3) 0.0576 0.1270 0.4537 0.6500
Equilibrium volatility C(4) 0.2459 0.0036 68.6295 0.0000
Equilibrium drift rate C(5) 0.0613 0.1129 0.5428 0.5873
Risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate C(6) -0.0547 0.0011 -50.7530 0.0000
Correlation in increments C(7) 0.1625 0.0291 5.5796 0.0000
Final State Root MSE z-Statistic Prob.  
Short-run deviation SV1 0.0585 0.0169 3.4635 0.0005
Long-run equilibrium SV2 4.6592 0.0154 302.1336 0.0000
Date: 03/01/13   Time: 12:07
Sample: 8/14/2007 12/07/2012
Sspace: KALMAN_BRENT_V2
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt)
User prior variance: M1
Failure to improve Likelihood after 54 iterations
Included observations: 1389
User prior mean: V1
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In the second step, the fit of the model estimation of future prices will be 
compared with the observable price of future contract of Brent Crude Oil. Figure 5.3 below plots 
the future contract prices estimated by equation (4.35) using the state variables and model 
parameters estimated by the Kalman filter against the true price of future contract at 01/21/2013 
(the sequential trade day after the end of the Kalman filter estimation data). It is possible to see 
that the prediction fits the real data with high accuracy for contracts until 45 month maturity; 
after that the real data becomes more flat, while the prices predicted by the estimated 
parameters maintain the downward trend. 
 
4 Figure 5.3 Projected future contract price with parameters estimated with Kalman filter vs 
observable future contract prices ICE-EU (01/21/2013) 
This difference in long maturities contracts is due to the fact that the data used to 
estimate the parameters using the Kalman filter had maturities until 24 months. To improve the 
fitness of the projected future contract price with the true observable prices, the implied 
estimated method proposed by Schwartz and Smith was also applied. Using the OptQuest 
software, a two inputs search method sought for a better estimate of the risk-neutral equilibrium 
drift rate (µξ*) and the short-term risk premium (λχ) in order to minimize the sum of the squared 
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differences. As a result, OptQuest found the new values of 8.67% and -4.02%, λχ and µξ*, 
respectively. 
The Kalman filter estimation used historical data of future contracts with 
maturities until 24 months. On the other side, the “implied estimate” compared this estimation 
with current market information which contains a traded future contract with maturities until 80 
month.  
The implied estimation of the short-term risk premium is still inside the standard 
error estimation region in Figure 5.2; however, the implied estimation of the risk-neutral drift rate 
is outside the confidence bound. Figure 5.4 shows the projection of the estimate of future 
contract prices against the observable future contract prices and confirms the robustness of the 
projection using these last parameters. 
 
5 Figure 5.4 Projected future contract price with parameters estimated with Kalman filter and 
implied method vs observable future contract prices ICE-EU (01/21/2013) 
After estimating the model parameters using the Kalman filter and adjusting two of these 
parameters with the implied method to better fit the observable future contract price curve, the 
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model parameters and initial state variables that are used in the risk-neutral stochastic price 
process for the project simulation are presented in Table 5.2. 
 
3 Table 5.2 Two-factor stochastic process parameters and initial state variables 
Figure 5.5 below shows three different trials for the risk adjusted stochastic oil prices 
simulated with the parameters at Table (5.2). 
 
6 Figure 5.5 - Simulation trials of the risk- adjusted oil price 
 
Parameter
Short-run mean reversion coefficient (k)
Short-run volatility (σχ)
Short-run risk premium (λχ)
Equilibrium volatility (σξ)
Long-run risk premium (λξ)
Risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate (µξ*)
Correlation in increments (ρξχ)
Initial State Variable
Short-run deviation (χ)













5.7  Parameter Estimation: Cost Escalation 
Costs are assumed to be known with certainty at the first year (Table 5.1), but 
after that it is considered to move stochastically, following a geometric Brownian motion 
stochastic process described at section 4.4.2. 
The estimation of parameters of the GBM stochastic process for cost escalation 
was based on the database from EIA (2010).  This study compares real 1976 operating and 
equipment costs indexes with a real 1976 oil prices index, in the period from 1976 to 2009. 
Figure 5.6, from EIA (2010) data, demonstrate these high correlations. 
 
7 Figure 5.6 Real OPEX and CAPEX index and real oil prices – EIA (2010) 
From the data available, it was possible to estimate the drift parameters of the 
real cost movements index were 1.5% for operating cost and 0% for equipment cost, with a 
standard variation of 8% and 5%, respectively. These drift parameters were converted to 
nominal index by adding the estimate of inflation of 1.5% from Cleveland Federal Reserve9. 
The correlation coefficients of the cost indices with oil prices were estimated as 
0.59 for equipment cost and 0.64 for operating. It is important to notice that this correlation 
coefficient measures the relation between changes in the cost indices and changes in the total 
                                               
9
 The Cleveland FED released an estimated of 10-years inflation expectation of 1.47%. Available at: 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/data/inflation_expectations/. Download at: 04/09/13. 
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movement of oil prices not divided into short-run and long-run components. However, for the 
use in this model, these estimated correlations were assumed to be corresponding to the 
correlation with the short run stochastic parameter of the two factor stochastic process10. Figure 
5.7 reproduces Figure 5.6 in nominal values, in a single trial from the simulation of oil prices and 
cost escalation index. 
 
8 Figure 5.7 –  Cost index OPEX and CAPEX vs oil prices (nominal) 
5.8  Government Decision Parameters 
This research performed several optimizations to evaluate the distortion effects 
of different combinations of government decision parameters in the PSA fiscal system. Once 
again, the decision variables available to the government are: 
i. ρ,õ 	 	.;		5		///	5	15/.	/3		)/	  	1…5-, 
ii. τ,ö  	//./3	12.6	5	6.	15/.	/3	;	)	  	0%, 10%,… , 90%-, 
iii. θ, 	 	2.	29	12.6	3//.		2/			.	./	0	)	  	1,2-, and 
                                               
10
 The correlation matrix between cost escalation and short run and long run stochastic processes is 
symmetric and positive semi-definite, so it is valid for Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
SR LR CAPEX OPEX
SR 1 0.16 0.59 0.64
LR 0.16 1 0 0
CAPEX 0.59 0 1 0





	 	2.	29	2;	43	5	21/.3	2.		2/			.	./	0	)  1,2-. 
The first decision parameter was considered in five different ways: the 
government share as a fixed percentage of the profit oil, three different sliding scale models 
based on production (cumulative production, current production and current production and oil 
prices) and sliding scale based on an R-factor.  
For the fixed percentage scenario (ρ1), the share of the government is equal to a 
constant value τ,* to be offered by the companies at the auction. 
The steps of sliding scale models were adjusted according to the most likely case 
for the recovery rate (26%) and the installation of standard FPSO with 150,000 processing 
capacity per day. For all cases, an upper bound of 96% to government share was assumed. 
Tables 5.3 to 5.6 describe the ranges considered in each case: 
Below 500 MMbbl τ,S 
From 500 to 1500 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+10%, 96%) 
From 1500 to 3000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+20%, 96%) 
From 3000 to 4000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+30%, 96%) 
From 4000 to 5000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+40%, 96%) 
Above 5000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+50%, 96%) 
4 Table 5.3 Sliding scale cumulative production (ρ2) 
Below 50 MMbbl/y τ0,3 
From 50 to 100 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+10%, 96%) 
From 100 to 150 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+20%, 96%) 
From 150 to 200 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+30%, 96%) 
Above 200 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+40%, 96%) 






 US$ 75 bbl 
From US$ 75 
to 85 bbl 
From U$ 85 to 
95 bbl 
From U$ 95 to 
110 bbl 
Above  




























































6Table 5.5 Sliding scale current production rate and current oil prices 
Below 1 τ0,5 
From 1 to 1.25 Min{τ0,5+5%, 96%) 
From 1.25 to 1.50 Min{τ0,5+10%, 96%) 
From 1.50 to 1.75 Min{τ0,5+15%, 96%) 
From 1.75 to 2 Min{τ0,5+20%, 96%) 
From 2 to 2.50 Min{τ0,5+25%, 96%) 
Above 2.5 Min{τ0,5+30%, 96%) 
7 Table 5.6 Sliding scale R-factor 
The second decision parameter, the initial percentage rate of the government 
share of the profit oil )τ,ö-, ranged from 0% to 90%, in 10% increment steps.  
The percentage limit of cost recovery )θ
,
- had two cases: 1) without limit, that 
is a 100% limit, and 2) if the contractor was able to recover their cost until a limit of 50% of the 
gross revenue less royalties. 
Finally, the cost recovery schedule for capital cost )γ
,
- was treated as if the 
contractor were able to expense all cost in the same period or if the capital cost were recovered 




5.9  Investors’ Decision Parameters 
From the investors’ side, the model searches for the optimum development 
timing and installed capacity for each module of production based on expected value of the 
firms’ inputs and outputs. A grind search selects the configuration which results in the highest 
expected NPV for the investor. 
The abandonment rule was set as a dynamic trigger to convert the production 
rate to be permanently equal to zero when the economic limit is achieved for each module of 
production. 
Companies were able to decide over the installation year of each FPSO from the 
first to the last year of the contract (35). This decision was constrained by a minimum of one 
year difference between each installation. The initial capacity of each FPSO was set to range 
from 100 to 175 thousand processing capacity per day with steps of 25 thousand. 
5.10  Optimization Procedures and Software Used 
This research compared a total number of 180 possible scenarios for the fiscal 
system, in which each one of the five methods of sharing the Profit Oil were simulated with two 
different limits and schedules for cost recovery and with nine initial values. In addition, to 
correctly assess the effect of uncertainty, nonlinearity of tax payments and skewness provided 
by the operational flexibility, a Monte Carlo simulation was performed. 
The software used to run the optimization was the Crystal Ball Release 
11.1.2.2.0 with the OptQuest add-in. Crystal Ball is one of several softwares available to 
perform the Monte Carlo simulation with Excel-based spreadsheets. OptQuest performs a direct 
search for the best decision variable according to the optimization objective. The add-in selects 
a value for each decision variable in the spreadsheet and runs the Monte Carlo simulation. The 
outcome is calculated and recorded, and new trials are done for different values of the decision 
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variables. At the end, the combination of decision variables that results in the overall best 
outcome is defined as the optimal decision11.  
The OptQuest objective was defined to maximize the mean of the company NPV 
as given in equation (4.16) and the decision variables were the installation year and the initial 
capacity of each FPSO. 
The installation year was set by a range from the starting date at the initial 
development plan (at a rate of one per year) until the year 35.The initial capacity of each FPSO 
has a lower bound of 100,000 bopd and an upper bound of 175,000 bopd, with steps of 25,000. 
The optimization control of the OptQuest was set to run 2,000 different 
combinations for the investor’s decisions and to achieve the optimal value after 250 non-
improving solutions. The number of trials in the Monte Carlo stochastic simulations was 2,500.  
This chapter has detailed the assumptions, the estimated parameters and the 
range of possible decisions to be made by the government and the investors. It also showed the 
solution technique used in the model optimization. The next chapter presents the result from the 
optimizations. 
  
                                               
11
 A more detailed definition of the method used by Optquest from the user manual is: “OptQuest runs a 
number of simulations in order to find the optimal solution to the LP problem. Hence, OptQuest searches 
through the process to improve the best solution. OptQuest is using multiple metaheuristic methods and 




CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the output from the model optimizations and interpretations 
that can be derived from them. As stated previously, different fiscal systems are evaluated 
through the maximization of the government utility, which is comprised by the government 
revenues and the percentage of total production to the total reserve. The companies’ decision 
over the control variable (start year, installed capacity and abandonment) in response to the 
fiscal system model is also presented. 
6.1  Reference Value Scenario 
The “reference value” of the project was measured running the optimization as if 
the project has no tax, but still subjected to the constraints of a maximum contract length of 35 
years and a minimum difference of one year between the installations of the modules of 
production. In the reference scenario, companies decide to start the production of each FPSO 
as early as possible and to install the maximum available production capacity, which is 175,000 
barrels processing capacity per day. 
In that scenario, the project distribution value has a mean of US$276,553 million 
(Figure 6.1) and the distribution of the total production has a mean of 4,206 million barrels 
(Figure 6.2), equivalent to 71.56% of the total physically recoverable reserve12. 
Figure 6.1 shows that the reference value distribution of the project has a 
positively skewed distribution. This can be explained by two factors. First, the oil price in the 
two-factor stochastic process has a lognormal distribution, and second, the abandonment 
operational flexibility allows companies to revise their initial plans as new information is 
                                               
12
 If the abandonment trigger is set to ,~ + 5	 ≥ k,~ ≥ T the mean of project reference value becomes 
US$ 276,562 and mean total production of 71,74% of total physically recoverable reserves. If it is set to 
,~ + 10	 ≥ k,~ ≥ T it becomes US$ 276,470 and 73,719%. 
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available, bringing positive skewness to the distribution of the value of a project via limiting 
losses. 
 
9 Figure 6.1 Reference value distribution 
The total production distribution (Figure 6.2) reflects the triangular distribution of 
the recovery rate uncertainty, but the high recovery estimate is not totally represented because 
of two constraints imposed in the optimization: the maximum capacity size of 175,000 bopd and 
the contract length of 35 years. 
 




6.2  “Basic Tax” Scenario 
The second optimization conducted, which will be considered the benchmark for 
the distortion analysis, considered the project as if it was exposed only to the taxes that are not 
related to the production-sharing fiscal system. In this scenario, the project will be subjected to 
the payment of US$100 million as signature bonus, 15% royalty over the gross revenue and 
35% corporate income tax. 
Adding these taxes brings the first distortion of the fiscal system to the 
production. The mean of the total production reduces almost 160 million barrels, corresponding 
to a percentage production of 68.88% of the total recovery reserve. The mean of the project 
total value reduces to US$275,256 million (Figure 6.3), distributed US$136,130 to the 
companies and US$139,127 to the government, representing a government take of 50.54%. 
 
11 Figure 6.3 Total project value distribution - "Basic tax scenario" 
The shape of the distribution of the project value and the total production is 
similar to the one presented in the reference case for the same causes explained above. 
Companies will also make the same decision regarding the start year of each FPSO and the 
production capacity. The difference in the level of the production between those first two 
scenarios is that in the “basic tax” case, companies will achieve the economic limit earlier than 




6.3  Production-Sharing Fiscal Systems Scenarios 
In this section, the outcome of different production-sharing tax systems will be 
presented separately and then compared to each other. It is possible to observe that all five 
models bring some kind of distortion to the companies’ decisions. It is also possible to detect 
distortions created by the limit in the cost recovery and the depreciation schedule for capital 
investment. 
6.3.1  Fixed Proportion Scenarios 
The first optimization performed with the production-sharing fiscal system 
considers the share of government of Profit Oil as a fixed percentage along the entire contract 
length (ρ1). Assuming no limit for the cost recovery and expensed CAPEX, the model does not 
bring any distortion up toτ,* ÷ 82%. Until that point, the government NPV increases with the 
increase in the government share of profit oil and the total production is the same as the “basic 
tax” scenario (Figure 6.4). 
Ifτ,* ø 83%, companies’ optimal decisions will lead to a reduction in the total 
installed capacity (Figure 6.5), dropping total production and total government revenues. The 
project will not be developed if τ,* ø 96%. 
 






13 Figure 6.5 Total installed capacity (01-1 Fix 100% Expensed) 
The model shows, that for a fixed proportion scenario, it is possible to find a 
corner solution, where both components of government utility function are at maximum.  The 
optimal level of government share of Profit Oil will be at τ,*  82%, where there is no distortion 
at the production and at project total value compared to the “base tax” case, the same 68.88% 
of the reserve was produced and the expected total value was US$275,256, with a government 
NPV of US$257,281 million. 
At this point, it is possible to show that the analysis of a fiscal system based only 
on the government take, as done by most of the previous research highlighted in the literature 
review, can lead to some incomplete analysis and erroneous conclusions. At the optimal point 
(τ,*  82%,) government take is 93.47% of the project profits. For τ,* ø 82%, the share of the 
government in the project continues to increase, but as seen above, it also brings distortions to 
the project’s optimal development, reducing the total project value and the government total 
revenues. However, if the analysis is based only on the government take indicator, the optimal 




14 Figure 6.6 Government take and NPV of government revenue (01-1 Fix 100% Expensed) 
If the government imposes a 50% percentage limit on the cost oil recovery)θ
,S

50%-, the production distortion becomes visible (Figure 6.7). In this case, it is not possible to 
find a corner solution to the government maximization problem. Until τ,*  70%	,	as the share of 
government profit oil increases, government revenue also rises, but at the same time total 
production falls. The optimal point is dependent on the parameter 8 in government utility 
function. 
If 8  0,75, where the government obtains more benefits from total revenues 
than total production, the optimal point will be at τ,*  70%. On the other hand, if 8  0,25, the 
optimal point will be at τ,*  50%, where the total revenue is lower, but the percentage of 
recoverable reserves produce at the end of the project is higher (Figure 6.7). Here it is also 
possible to observe another benefit of an analysis based on a utility function. If the government 
has multiple objectives, a decision based simply on total government revenue may lead to 
wrong conclusions.  
Moreover, looking at Figure 6.7, we can observe that the percentage which 
maximizes the government utility will be found in the area whereτ,* ÷ 70%; above that, the 





15 Figure 6.7 Government NPV and % reserve produced (01-2-Fix 50% Expensed) 
The distortion created by a percentage limit on cost recovery will not influence 
the companies’ decisions over the start year or the installed capacity until τ,* ÷ 70%		(Figure 
6.8), leading only to earlier abandonment of the modules of production.  This abandonment is 
created by the fact that in late years, production companies are not able to fully recover the 
higher unit operational costs, and the economic limit is achieved quickly. Figure 6.9 compares 
the simulation of the production curve with and without cost recovery limit, and we can see that 
the scenario with less constraint has a longer life. 
 





17 Figure 6.9 Production curve with and without cost recovery limit (01-1 Fix 100% Expensed vs 
01-2-Fix 50% Expensed) 
The second parameter that government can impose on the cost recovery is a 
depreciation schedule for the recovery of the capital investment. The optimization assumes that 
CAPEX should be recovered according to a 20-year straight line schedule. The model output 
shows that this parameter does not bring distortion and increases the government NPV 
compared with the first analysis in the fixed proportion, until a τ,*  70%	(Figure 6.10). After 
that, the installed capacity is reduced, resulting in lower production and less government 
revenue. 
Finally, the optimization was performed by adding two constraints to the cost 
recovery: a 50% limit and 20 years depreciation. For τ,* ÷ 40%, this fiscal model produces the 
highest government NPV among the four cases of fixed government share, but the total 
production is reduced due to early abandonment. However, this system does not change the 
start year and installed capacity decisions until τ,*  60%.	 Furthermore, forτ,* ≥ 90%,	 the 
optimal decision for the companies is to invest in the installation of only three modules of 
production, with an aggregate capacity of 300,000 bopd, producing only 22% of the reserves. 
Appendix A compares the outcome from these four different possible systems for the fixed 
percentage production-sharing contract and the optimal investor’s decision regarding the 




18 Figure 6.10 Government NPV and % Reserve Produced (01-1-Fix 100% Expensed vs 01-3-Fix 
100% Sl20y) 
In sum, for the fixed proportion model, the model outcome shows no distortionary 
effect of the fiscal system over the timing investment decision. The reductions on capacity size 
only start to appear at high levels of the tax rate. In the less constrained scenario of cost 
recovery, it is also possible to find a corner solution which maximizes both parameters of 
government utility. The inclusion of a percentage limit to cost recovery induces early 
abandonment distortions for all levels of τ,*. The depreciation schedule for capital cost 
increases the government NPV at lower levels of τ,*, but at the cost of reducing the optimal 
capacity size at inferior rates. 
This first section has evaluated the distortionary effects when the government 
share is a fixed rate during all the life of the field. The next sections introduce models based on 
sliding scale rates. 
6.3.2  Sliding Scale Cumulative Production Scenarios 
The second model of a production-sharing fiscal system optimized was the 
sliding scale based on cumulative production. This model increases the percentage of 
government share of profit oil as the cumulative production achieves some levels, as shown in 
Table 5.3.  
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Similar to the fixed percentage, this system does not bring distortion to the 
companies’ timing decisions. Investors are encouraged to perform the investment as early as 
possible because the level of production will have no influence on the profit oil tax rate.  
However, investment in production capacity will be decreasing for τ,S ø 20%	in 
all cases (Figure 6.11), and early abandonment will also play an important role in reducing the 
project value and total production. At higher levels of τ,S, the optimal decision for the companies 
will be to not develop all 6 modules of production and leave a great share of the reserves in the 
ground. 
 
19 Figure 6.11 Total installed capacity – Sliding scale cumulative production 
With no limit to cost recovery, the installed capacity and total production fall after 
τ,S  20%,	but government revenue continues to rise until achieving its peak atτ,S  40%. After 
that, both the total production and the government NPV diminish as τ,S	increases (Figure 6.12). 
In this fiscal system design, there is no observed corner solution, and the point that maximizes 
government should be chosen between τ,S  20% and τ,S  40%, according to the parameter 
8. The reduction in the total installed capacity is because in this fiscal system design, all the 
benefits to produce above a certain level of cumulative production reverts to the government, 
and companies have no incentive to expand production after some cumulative level. 
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The imposition of a 50% limit on cost recovery in the cumulative production fiscal 
system always results in early abandonment and reduces the installed capacity for τ,S ≥ 20%, 
Furthermore, this method results in lower government NPV and production at all levels of τ,S 
compared to the first cumulative scenario (Figure 6.12), which, given the government utility 
function assumed in this model, demonstrates a strict dominance of the first case in relation to 
the one with limited cost recovery. 
 
20  Figure 6.12 – Government NPV and % Reserve Produced (02-1- Cum. 100% Expensed vs 02-
2-Cum. 50% Expensed) 
The optimizations with depreciation for CAPEX recovery result in unexpected 
outcomes. For τ,S ÷ 40%, the depreciation increases the company NPV and reduces 
government revenues. This can be explained by the fact that in a sliding scale with cumulative 
production, the government is expected to take a greater share of profit oil at long-term periods, 
when the cumulative production is higher. 
Once again, the system that imposes a limit on cost recovery and a depreciation 
schedule is the one that brings more distortion to the fiscal system. Appendix B compares the 
outcome for those four different possible combinations of a sliding scale cumulative production. 
Compared to the fixed proportion case, the sliding scale cumulative production 
fiscal system results in more change in a firms’ optimal decision. Consequently, the project total 
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value and government revenues are reduced more heavily. At all optimizations with sliding scale 
cumulative production, the highest value for government revenue was US$217,909 million, at 
the point τ,S  40%  for the optimization with no cost recovery limit and an expensed CAPEX. 
This value is significantly lower than the government NPV in the optimal solution for the fixed 
proportion. In addition, in the last case, the total production is higher. The next section shows 
the optimization outcome of a sliding scale based on current production. 
6.3.3  Sliding Scale Production Rate 
The third group of optimizations was performed under a production-sharing 
based on a sliding scale production rate. In this method, the government share is greater with 
higher levels of current production (Table 5.4). In consequence, companies are likely to adjust 
the production curve to avoid achieving some levels of production which are subjected to 
greater government share. These adjustments are performed by both reducing the installed 
capacity and delaying the installation of sequential production modules, creating strong 
distortion in the production path. 
With no constraints for cost recovery, the production path is the same as the 
“basic tax” case only if τ,T ÷ 20%	 Above that, companies change the start year, the production 
capacity or decide not to invest, reducing the total production and the project’s total value. 
Figure 6.13 shows that government revenue decreases after the peak observed at τ,T  20%. 
In this figure, it is also possible to observe the share of the three main sources of government 
revenue along different levels of τ,T.  
As an example of the change in the production path, at τ,T  40% companies 
maximize the NPV with an installed 625,000 producing capacity and a delay of the start of 
production of the last two modules of production respectively to years 9 (nine) and 16 (sixteen). 
This development profile limits the production to be below 150 million barrels per year to evade 
taxation at higher levels. Figure 6.14 compares the optimal production path of the “basic tax” 




21 Figure 6.13 Government revenue (03-1- Prod. 100% Expensed) 
 
22  Figure 6.14 Production curves: “basic tax” vs. sliding scale with current production 03-1- Prod. 
100% Expensed) 
Adding constraints to the cost recovery increases the distortions created by this 
fiscal system.  The companies’ responses to avoid taxation results in a continual reduction in 
the total production and government revenue as τ,T	increases from its lowest level. Appendix C 
compares the outcome for those four different fiscal systems based on current production 
sliding scale production sharing. 
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From now on, the model shows that as the fiscal system adds increasing sliding 
scale tax rates companies are more willing to change its optimal decision to avoid taxation. By 
considering production as a measure of field profitability, those fiscal systems’ designs induce 
investors to adjust the production path to keep the tax rate at a lower level. The next section 
considers a sliding scale current production which also accounts for differences in the oil price 
level. 
6.3.4  Sliding Scale Production Rate and Oil Prices 
The next fiscal system optimized in this research changes the government 
percentage of Profit Oil according to a matrix of current production and current price (Table 5.5). 
In the same way as the previous model, companies try to avoid reaching some levels of 
production rate to evade high tax rates, reducing capacity and delaying installation. 
Price levels also influence the government percentage, and in this model, 
investors with rational expectations presume lower prices level in the future. Litzenberger and 
Rabonowitz (1995) showed empirical evidence that future oil markets are in backwardation most 
of the time. Because of that, companies will also be willing to increase the delay in the 
production in order to be subjected to reduced rates. This decision represents a trade-off 
between delayed production in order to wait for lower prices and reduced tax or avoiding the 
positive drift in cost escalation. 
This fiscal system brings distortion in production for all optimizations. Among all 
the fiscal systems optimized, this one results in the lowest installed capacity, smallest total 
production and least government revenue. Figure 6.15 shows the graph of model output for the 
case with no constraint in the cost recovery. The reduction in the total production is observed 
since the first levels of τ,U, diminishing the project value and government NPV. 
Appendix D compares the outcome for those four different fiscal systems based 





23 Figure 6.15 – Government NPV and % Reserve Produced (02-1- Prod_Price 100% Expensed) 
This last group of optimizations confirms the previous observation that sliding 
scale designs based on production leads to stronger distortionary effects. As expected, firms 
decide to delay the production in most of the optimizations to benefit from lower tax rates; 
however, the positive drift in cost escalation results in lower installed capacity, and the final 
outcome is a reduction in total production and project value. The next section presents the result 
of the optimizations of a different model for sliding scale founded in a profitability index 
commonly used in the petroleum industry, the R-factor. 
6.3.5  Sliding Scale R-Factor 
The last fiscal system optimized attempts to measure the profitability of the field 
according to a ratio of cumulative revenue over cumulative cost (Table 5.6). The higher the ratio 
the greater the government shares of Profit Oil. In this model, companies seek to stay at lower 
ratio levels by investing in high production capacity at early years. 
This system does not distort the production path for τ,V ÷ 50% in scenarios of no 
constraint for cost recovery. Figure 6.16 shows that the optimal point for the government utility is 
not found in a corner solution, but at some point between τ,V  50%	and τ,V  55%.  
The introduction of a 50% limit on cost recovery does not change the company’s 
decision over the start year of operation and the total installed capacity for τ,V ÷ 40%. However, 
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because of early abandonment, the total production falls as τ,V increases (Figure 6.16). In this 
graph, it is also possible to identify strict dominance for the model with no limit in cost recovery. 
 
24  Figure 6.16 Government NPV and % Reserve Produced (05-1- R-factor 100% Expensed vs 05-
2– R-factor 50% Expensed) 
If the recovery of capital cost occurs by the straight line 20-year schedule, the 
optimization results in no distortion for	τ,V ÷ 40% and produces more government revenues 
compared to the first case. Nevertheless, the reduction of installed capacity after this point is 
faster than the first case, and the optimal point results in lower total production and government 
NPV (Figure 6.17).  Appendix E compares the outcome for these four different fiscal systems 
based on R-factor sliding scale production sharing. 
Compared to the other sliding scale methods, the R-factor model creates less 
distortion of investors’ decisions. In addition, the output at the optimal level of initial tax rate is 
very close to the outcome from the optimal point of the fixed proportion model. The next chapter 











CHAPTER 7  
RESULTS COMPARISION 
 
This research introduces a new approach to measure the distortionary effects of 
a fiscal system. First of all, it looks at the problem from the perspective of the host government, 
while most of the previous studies based their analyses on firms’ optimality regarding the project 
NPV or other profitability indicators. The second element is that the model optimization is based 
on a more complete indicator of government objectives, which accounts for both the total 
government revenue and the deadweight loss created by the tax system.  
The most commonly used indicators of effective tax, the government take, simply 
measure the portion of the government revenues in the total project value, ignoring total 
estimated total tax to be collected and also the total project value. Furthermore, if the analysis 
only looks at government NPV, it also misrepresents the deadweight loss, especially in 
situations where an increase in the tax rate may lead to a greater government inflow but at the 
cost of lower total production or project total value. An analysis based on government utility, can 
capture the most important aspects that governments can consider important. 
The model also advances previous research by implementing a more complete 
behavioral model for the firms in response to the tax system. In the model operational flexibility 
was measured via companies’ decisions regarding the optimal start date of production, the 
optimal processing capacity and the optimal abandonment year of each module of production. 
In addition, by using the Modern Asset Pricing approach for risk adjustment at source and 
Monte Carlo simulation for account non-linearity in the project, the model also incorporate a 
more consistent valuation framework, which leads to more reliable value outcomes to be 
compared across fiscal designs. Finally, four sources of uncertainty were considered, with each 
source of uncertainty having important implications for firms’ choices under various fiscal 
systems. 
The optimizations’ outcomes show that all fiscal systems evaluated produce 
distortion over the companies’ optimal decisions and companies adjust their choices to avoid 
taxation in different ways according to the fiscal system’s characteristics. Moreover, it revealed 
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that fiscal systems with tax provisions that try to capture additional project profits based on the 
production as profitability measures lead to stronger distortions in the project profile.  
A cumulative production fiscal system intends to tax the additional surplus from 
fields with higher recovery rates, but because the government captures the supplementary 
profit, companies do not have incentive to continue the production after a certain cumulative 
level. The outcome is smaller installed capacity and early abandonment with more oil left in the 
ground, but no change in the timing decision. 
Under the terms of a current production sliding scale fiscal system, companies 
adjust their producing capacity and timing decisions to spread the production over the contract 
length and avoid achieving production rates exposed to higher tax. 
The current production and oil price fiscal system is the design that creates most 
distortions in the project value, with lower installed capacity, smaller total production and 
reduced government revenues. 
Compared to the systems based on production level, the R-factor sliding scale 
and the fixed proportion are the systems that create less distortion and generate greater 
government revenue. The R-factor fiscal system creates incentive for the companies to perform 
large and early investments to take advantage of small tax rates associated with low R-factor 
ratios. After that, companies utilize the large installed capacity to produce until achieving 
economic limits. However, at high tax levels, even low R-factor ratios reduce the incentive to 
invest in capacity size and the output is a reduction in project value. 
On the other hand, in the fixed proportion fiscal system companies will be 
subjected to the same government share of profit oil independently of any operational decision 
in which they can make changes to the production profile to evade taxation. Distortions appear 
only at high tax levels, where the percentage of government share makes the benefits of a large 
production capacity lower than its costs. One important outcome in the fixed proportion 
optimizations is the possibility of finding corner solutions, where both parameters of the 
government utility function are maximized at the same time. Figure 7.1 compares the outcome 





26  Figure 7.1 Government NPV and % Reserve Produced (01-1- Fix 100% Expensed vs 05-1– R-
factor 100% Expensed) 
Comparing the output of the optimizations performed with the five different fiscal 
system designs reveals that in sliding scale models, companies adjust their optimal decision to 
evade high tax rates levels. At the fixed proportion model, companies will be subjected to the 
same tax rate independently of the production path, so changes in optimal decisions are 
ineffective for reducing the tax border. 
Another important issue to be considered is that in the presence of recovery rate, 
cost and price uncertainty, the definition of levels of production or profitability ratios is a very 
difficult and problematic task and encourages substantial distortions (Johnston, 1994). 
The model also allows the comparison of the fiscal system designs using 
different levels of the government utility parameter	8.Table 7.1 below shows rankings comparing 
the optimal taxation point for the scenarios with no constraint in the cost recovery with the 
parameter 8 set as 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25. It shows that the orders of preference of the fiscal 
system are the same for different government utility functions. The system that possibly creates 
more utility to the government is the one based on fixed proportion, closely followed by the R-
factor system. As the production rate and oil price sliding scale system is the one which 
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potentially generate more distortions at companies’ optimal decision it is also the one with lower 
government utility. 
 
Fiscal system ranking α = 0.75 α = 0.5 α = 0.25 
1  Fixed proportion 0.938 0.946 0.954 
2  R-factor 0.934 0.940 0.949 
3  Production rate 0.824 0.868 0.914 
4  Cumulative Production 0.817 0.851 0.894 
5  Production rate and oil price 0.649 0.696 0.818 
8 Table 7.1 Fiscal system ranking and government utility 
The optimizations also evaluate the effects of the imposition of a 50% limit on 
cost recovery. This provision decreases the total production in every scenario optimized, 
showing strict dominance of the model without limit in relation to this one. This reduction is 
caused mainly by early abandonment, but also due to reduction in the optimal level of 
production capacity. 
Furthermore, the optimizations regarding the 20-year straight line depreciation 
schedule for the recovery of capital investments has uncertain outcomes. This provision 
normally results in few distortions in the production path and greater government revenue at 
lower levels of tax rates; though it reduces the installed capacity decision for higher tax rates 
levels. On the other hand, this method of cost recovery applied to the sliding scale cumulative 
production produces some surprising outcomes when the government revenue decreases and 
investors’ NPV rises.  
Even though the basic model structure and the simulated parameters are 
adjusted to reflect the current Brazilian regulatory framework, most of the insights shown above 
can be extended to projects with similar characteristics: an undeveloped sequential modular 
offshore project in the presence of systematic and unsystematic uncertainties. 
It is a difficult task to compare the results from this research to the conclusions of 
previous studies cited in the literature review. Firstly, most of those studies do not compare all 
the different methods of production-sharing fiscal systems designs. Secondly, they create 
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rankings based solely on the measurement of investors’ perception of project value, profitability 
and breakeven prices. The comparisons based on government take do not estimate for the total 
revenue generated for the government by the project. Furthermore, most of those studies do not 
account for the total value of the project and the deadweight loss created by the fiscal system. 
However, the results from this research can be partially compared to the 
conclusion from few studies. The ranking of distortion effect used by Blake & Roberts (2006), 
which captures the deadweight loss created by different fiscal systems, also concluded that a 
production-sharing fiscal system based on production and prices, as adopted at Trinidad & 
Tobago, is the fiscal system design which creates more distortion among the models studied.  In 
addition, Smith (2012b) observes that the fixed proportion production sharing with uplift is the 
model of production-sharing fiscal system which creates less reduction in the project value. 
Nevertheless, these studies do not give a complete insight over the optimal 
design for the fiscal system for the maximization of the government utility, which integrates the 






CHAPTER 8   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This research has evaluated the distortion effects of a production-sharing fiscal 
system applied to an offshore field with sequential modular development. The optimization was 
performed on a real case field, but the insight from the model can be extended to any field with 
similar characteristics. 
The model’s objective was to maximize government utility, taken to be a function 
of the expected government revenues and the expected percentage of the reserve produced 
during the project life. The distortions were captured by a companies’ behavioral model which 
evaluated the optimal decision regarding the start time of the production, the capacity size and 
the abandonment date of each of the modules of production. The theoretical base was the 
Modern Asset Pricing approach, a valuation procedure that captures a better estimate of the 
project value in the presence of uncertainty and also identifies the optimal operational decisions 
to the managers during the life of the project. In addition, the oil price dynamic was modeled by 
the sophisticated two-factor stochastic process model from Schwartz & Smith (2000). 
This research has advanced from most of the previous studies by incorporating a 
new approach in the measurement of the effectiveness of the tax system, from the host 
government’s perspective. In addition, the indicator of the optimal design captures a more 
complete measurement of the government’s objectives, which in this case were the total tax 
revenues and the deadweight loss. 
The model also includes a behavioral model that accounts for the most important 
decision in the project development and accounts for uncertain inputs which are normally 
ignored, such as the cost escalation and the recovery rate. In addition, the theoretical approach 
and techniques used in the project value estimation also bring more reliable outputs. 
The optimization has compared the output of five different production-sharing 
methods and the imposition of a limit to cost recovery and a depreciation schedule for capital 
cost recovery. The first method, the fixed percentage, resulted in lower distortions. In this 
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method, companies are subjected to the same tax rate during the total length of the contract 
and have few benefits to avoid taxation by changing their optimal decisions. On the other hand, 
sliding scale methods allow companies to adjust their optimal decisions and production profiles 
to avoid high tax rates and maximize their profits. One additional problem with sliding scale 
models is the difficulty in the definition of the values for the different tax rates levels.  
Another important finding was that comparing the fiscal system designs using 
different government utility parameters 8 leads to the same ranking order: the fixed proportion 
system is one which potentially generates more government utility and the production rate and 
oil prices sliding scale system is the worse fiscal system design. 
From the optimizations results, it was also possible to observe that the limit in 
cost recovery always bring distortion in the production, mainly by early abandonment, but also 
by reducing the installed capacity 
The outcome from the scenarios with depreciation of CAPEX showed that, in 
most of the cases, the government revenue increases without creating distortion for lower 
values of the initial percentage of government profit oil share (τ,ö). However, this model induces 
reduction in the total installed capacity as this parameter increases. 
As stated before, it is difficult to compare the results from this research with 
previous studies, as the outcomes from most of these models are based on investors’ 
indicators, but compared to the few studies that have similar indicators, the results were similar: 
the model based on a fixed rate is the most neutral, while the model based on production and 
price is the one that creates more distortions. The conclusion may be similar, but it is important 
to remember that those studies do not look at the optimization problem from a completely 
integrated government point of view as introduced by this research. 
However, there are many improvements that can be incorporated into the model. 
First, the model could be improved to evaluate the companies’ decisions in response to the tax 
system for deposits in different levels of information, since an unexplored prospect. 
Furthermore, the model considers that the costs at the start of the project are deterministic and 




Decision of timing and capacity at year zero could be decided dynamically during 
the life of the project and also the abandonment decision could be treated as a forward looking 
dynamic decision. These changes would demand more complex optimization techniques such 
as Simple Least-Squares approach, proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (1998), which 
incorporate simulations and backward induction analysis.  
One important parameter which was considered as constant among all the 
optimizations was the value of the signature bonus. This parameter is also an important 
decision to be made by the government before the auction of the project, and it is believed to be 
likely that the reaction of investors in the presence of this high sunk cost at the beginning of the 
project would be different, especially the increase in the number of cases where the entire 
project would be uneconomical. This parameter could be incorporated as an endogenous 
government decision in the model. 
Finally, important and problematic issues discussed above, which can also be 
included as a control variable, are the optimal values for production level and profitability ratios 
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APPENDIX A – RESULTS FIXED PERCENTAGE  
01-1 - FIX 100% 
EXPENSED 
no tax base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 82% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 121,840 107,541 93,233 78,907 64,554 50,154 35,663 20,964 17,976 6,930 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 153,417 167,715 182,024 196,349 210,702 225,102 239,594 254,292 257,281 203,145 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,044 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 210,075 
% produced total 
reserves 
71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 51.91% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 55.74% 60.93% 66.13% 71.33% 76.55% 81.78% 87.04% 92.38% 93.47% 96.70% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 41,539 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 21,940 43,880 65,820 87,760 109,700 131,640 153,580 175,520 179,908 152,498 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 73,959 66,317 58,686 51,071 43,484 35,944 28,495 21,254 19,854 9,007 
Total Capacity 1050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 17,976 600 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.637 0.681 0.724 0.766 0.808 0.849 0.889 0.930 0.938 0.732 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.731 0.764 0.796 0.827 0.856 0.885 0.913 0.941 0.946 0.730 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.839 0.858 0.875 0.892 0.908 0.923 0.938 0.952 0.954 0.728 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
9 Table A.1 Results fixed proportion, 100% cost recovery limit and CAPEX expensed.  
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01-2-FIX50%EXPENSED No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 121,009 105,899 90,784 75,698 60,689 45,718 30,750 16,350 4,463 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 153,712 168,131 182,301 196,244 209,938 223,136 235,720 216,686 192,111 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,995 3,937 3,871 3,802 3,725 3,640 3,543 2,978 2,404 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 274,721 274,030 273,085 271,941 270,627 268,854 266,470 233,036 196,574 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 67.98% 66.99% 65.87% 64.70% 63.40% 61.95% 60.30% 50.73% 41.00% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 55.95% 61.35% 66.76% 72.16% 77.57% 83.00% 88.46% 92.98% 97.73% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,190 56,926 56,600 56,236 55,830 55,330 54,706 46,531 37,998 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 22,730 45,307 67,670 89,791 111,635 133,021 153,812 153,306 145,714 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 73,692 65,799 57,932 50,116 42,374 34,685 27,103 16,749 8,300 
Total Capacity 1050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 825 600 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.636 0.677 0.717 0.754 0.789 0.821 0.850 0.764 0.662 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.727 0.754 0.779 0.801 0.820 0.836 0.848 0.745 0.631 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.831 0.840 0.847 0.851 0.852 0.851 0.845 0.727 0.601 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 




01-3-FIX100%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 120,973 105,816 90,658 75,501 60,343 45,184 30,025 15,869 3,936 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 154,284 169,441 184,598 199,756 214,914 230,072 245,232 230,462 206,139 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,573 3,044 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 246,332 210,075 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 60.84% 51.91% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 56.05% 61.56% 67.06% 72.57% 78.08% 83.58% 89.09% 93.56% 98.13% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 50,130 41,539 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 23,317 46,634 69,951 93,268 116,585 139,901 163,218 165,725 158,353 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 73,449 65,289 57,129 48,970 40,811 32,653 24,495 14,508 6,146 
Total Capacity 1050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 825 600 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.639 0.686 0.731 0.776 0.820 0.863 0.905 0.838 0.740 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.733 0.768 0.802 0.834 0.865 0.895 0.924 0.842 0.735 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.840 0.860 0.878 0.896 0.912 0.928 0.943 0.846 0.730 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 150 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 




01-4-FIX50%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 120,091 104,063 88,027 72,014 56,078 40,165 24,809 11,807 1,080 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 154,629 169,967 185,058 199,927 214,549 228,689 220,076 187,850 106,316 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,995 3,937 3,871 3,802 3,725 3,640 3,206 2,506 1,285 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 274,721 274,030 273,085 271,941 270,627 268,854 244,885 199,657 107,395 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 67.98% 66.99% 65.87% 64.70% 63.40% 61.95% 54.59% 42.74% 21.91% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 56.29% 62.02% 67.77% 73.52% 79.28% 85.06% 89.87% 94.09% 98.99% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,190 56,926 56,600 56,236 55,830 55,330 49,342 38,700 20,544 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 24,141 48,131 71,912 95,459 118,731 141,575 149,080 137,372 82,565 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 73,198 64,810 56,446 48,132 39,888 31,683 21,553 11,677 3,106 
Total Capacity 1050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 875 600 300 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.638 0.683 0.725 0.765 0.802 0.836 0.787 0.658 0.363 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.729 0.759 0.785 0.808 0.829 0.846 0.779 0.637 0.343 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.832 0.843 0.850 0.855 0.857 0.856 0.771 0.617 0.324 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - 




APPENDIX B– RESULTS SLIDING SCALE CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION 
02-1-CUM100%EXPENSED No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 91,648 77,301 63,184 49,063 35,576 23,369 12,444 5,231 1,219 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 183,608 197,956 206,445 216,721 207,601 203,222 197,631 142,935 38,724 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,949 3,884 3,549 3,283 3,044 2,092 544 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 269,629 265,784 243,177 226,591 210,075 148,166 39,943 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 67.21% 66.11% 60.45% 55.94% 51.91% 35.67% 9.28% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 66.70% 71.92% 76.57% 81.54% 85.37% 89.69% 94.08% 96.47% 96.95% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 55,943 55,010 49,541 45,431 41,539 29,058 7,743 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 68,176 90,116 108,127 127,010 132,074 139,413 144,148 107,328 29,433 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 57,914 50,321 42,276 34,601 25,886 18,277 11,843 6,449 1,448 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 1000 975 825 700 600 400 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.5917 0.7285 0.7708 0.7906 0.8166 0.7732 0.7463 0.7173 0.5122 0.1374 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.6959 0.7994 0.8301 0.8374 0.8509 0.7963 0.7579 0.7200 0.5076 0.1347 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.8184 0.8772 0.8939 0.8869 0.8866 0.8202 0.7697 0.7227 0.5030 0.1322 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 125 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 0 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 0 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 0 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 0 0 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 125 100 100 100 100 0 0 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - 




02-2-CUM50%EXPENSED No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 89,997 75,019 60,437 46,127 33,055 21,159 11,201 4,343 1,015 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 182,234 195,911 199,822 212,224 200,455 194,869 129,399 102,955 36,710 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,821 3,751 3,531 3,448 3,036 2,736 1,721 1,283 443 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 272,231 270,929 260,260 258,351 233,510 216,028 140,600 107,298 37,724 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 65.06% 63.87% 60.13% 58.71% 51.73% 46.63% 29.35% 21.88% 7.56% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 66.94% 72.31% 76.78% 82.15% 85.84% 90.21% 92.03% 95.95% 97.31% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 56,314 55,924 53,204 52,693 46,561 42,450 27,028 20,522 7,163 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 68,131 89,951 105,138 125,383 128,696 134,535 92,788 77,273 28,033 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 57,689 49,936 41,380 34,047 25,098 17,785 9,483 5,060 1,413 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 975 975 800 700 400 300 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.714 0.751 0.750 0.780 0.724 0.691 0.453 0.354 0.125 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.774 0.795 0.779 0.794 0.724 0.678 0.438 0.337 0.118 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.839 0.842 0.809 0.807 0.723 0.665 0.424 0.321 0.112 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 150 125 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 150 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - 





02-3-CUM100%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 92,641 77,483 62,612 47,875 34,085 21,854 11,520 4,377 884 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 182,616 197,774 207,016 217,909 209,092 204,737 166,570 109,611 39,059 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,949 3,884 3,549 3,283 2,560 1,591 544 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 269,629 265,784 243,177 226,591 178,090 113,988 39,943 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 67.21% 66.11% 60.45% 55.94% 43.65% 27.13% 9.28% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 66.34% 71.85% 76.78% 81.99% 85.98% 90.36% 93.53% 96.16% 97.79% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 55,943 55,010 49,541 45,431 35,123 22,271 7,743 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 66,897 90,214 109,510 129,565 135,125 142,589 121,869 83,102 30,195 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 58,201 50,042 41,464 33,234 24,326 16,616 9,478 4,139 1,021 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 1000 975 825 700 500 300 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.726 0.770 0.792 0.820 0.777 0.750 0.604 0.392 0.138 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.797 0.830 0.839 0.853 0.799 0.761 0.606 0.388 0.135 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.876 0.894 0.887 0.888 0.822 0.771 0.608 0.383 0.132 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 125 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 125 100 100 100 - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - 





02-4-CUM50%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 89,651 73,862 58,448 43,700 30,490 18,446 9,341 3,162 354 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 182,580 194,236 201,812 192,989 183,544 181,997 131,259 70,552 37,370 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,821 3,709 3,531 3,146 2,766 2,529 1,721 882 443 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 272,231 268,098 260,260 236,689 214,033 200,443 140,600 73,715 37,724 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 65.06% 63.17% 60.13% 53.61% 47.16% 43.14% 29.35% 15.04% 7.56% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 67.07% 72.45% 77.54% 81.54% 85.75% 90.80% 93.36% 95.71% 99.06% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 56,314 55,209 53,204 47,498 42,041 38,867 27,028 14,066 7,163 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 68,664 89,911 108,208 114,627 119,254 127,868 95,743 53,092 29,131 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 57,502 49,016 40,299 30,765 22,149 15,162 8,388 3,295 976 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1025 975 825 675 600 400 200 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.715 0.744 0.756 0.710 0.663 0.644 0.458 0.243 0.127 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.775 0.787 0.783 0.723 0.661 0.630 0.441 0.232 0.119 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.839 0.834 0.811 0.736 0.660 0.616 0.425 0.221 0.112 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 150 175 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - 





APPENDIX C – RESULTS SLIDING SCALE PRODUCTION RATE 
03-1-
PROD100%EXPENSED 
No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 73,267 58,906 47,041 36,379 26,076 17,061 10,177 4,485 1,443 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 201,990 216,351 163,034 156,114 164,430 118,401 103,811 73,341 43,455 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,044 2,885 2,846 1,974 1,591 1,075 613 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 210,075 192,493 190,507 135,462 113,988 77,825 44,898 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 51.91% 49.18% 48.54% 33.65% 27.13% 18.33% 10.44% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 73.38% 78.60% 77.61% 81.10% 86.31% 87.41% 91.07% 94.24% 96.79% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 41,539 38,568 37,994 26,804 22,271 15,152 8,861 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 96,441 118,381 91,902 93,291 107,862 79,461 73,896 54,229 32,608 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 48,031 40,452 29,493 24,155 18,475 12,036 7,545 3,860 1,885 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 600 625 600 400 300 200 125 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.783 0.824 0.621 0.593 0.614 0.438 0.376 0.263 0.154 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.838 0.868 0.654 0.623 0.635 0.449 0.377 0.261 0.151 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.898 0.914 0.689 0.654 0.656 0.459 0.378 0.258 0.149 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 100 125 100 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 11 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 9 8 - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 16 15 - - - - 




03-2-PROD50%EXPENSED No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 70,735 57,034 44,972 34,051 24,073 15,441 9,162 3,888 1,195 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 201,227 160,628 160,431 153,123 147,416 113,440 99,860 70,070 36,607 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,805 2,996 2,743 2,548 2,230 1,669 1,340 891 445 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 271,962 217,663 205,403 187,174 171,488 128,881 109,023 73,958 37,802 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 64.79% 51.07% 46.80% 43.46% 38.04% 28.48% 22.85% 15.19% 7.59% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 73.99% 73.80% 78.11% 81.81% 85.96% 88.02% 91.60% 94.74% 96.84% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 56,276 43,391 40,130 36,970 33,514 25,081 20,921 14,126 7,181 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 97,411 80,772 91,248 92,486 96,455 76,594 71,501 52,103 27,826 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 47,440 36,365 28,953 23,567 17,347 11,666 7,339 3,741 1,500 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 700 600 625 525 400 300 200 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.768 0.612 0.598 0.567 0.533 0.407 0.350 0.242 0.125 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.812 0.644 0.616 0.580 0.532 0.404 0.340 0.232 0.119 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.857 0.678 0.635 0.593 0.532 0.401 0.329 0.222 0.112 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 100 100 125 125 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 125 100 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 12 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 9 9 - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 9 6 16 - - - - - 




03-3-PROD100%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 70,339 57,354 45,745 34,459 24,212 15,359 8,919 3,722 1,086 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 204,917 155,603 167,212 158,074 153,255 118,657 101,012 74,103 38,857 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 3,095 3,095 2,884 2,577 1,958 1,560 1,075 544 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 212,957 212,957 192,533 177,468 134,015 109,931 77,825 39,943 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 52.77% 52.77% 49.18% 43.93% 33.39% 26.60% 18.33% 9.28% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 74.45% 73.07% 78.52% 82.10% 86.36% 88.54% 91.89% 95.22% 97.28% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 42,318 42,318 38,598 35,265 26,534 21,588 15,152 7,743 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 101,211 77,996 95,855 96,324 101,263 81,072 72,643 55,713 29,884 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 46,188 35,189 28,939 23,053 16,627 10,951 6,682 3,137 1,130 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 625 625 625 525 400 300 200 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.791 0.602 0.635 0.599 0.569 0.438 0.367 0.265 0.138 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.845 0.644 0.668 0.627 0.583 0.447 0.368 0.262 0.135 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.902 0.689 0.702 0.656 0.598 0.457 0.370 0.259 0.132 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 125 125 125 125 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 12 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 9 9 - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 7 7 16 - - - - - 




03-4-PROD50%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 67,521 67,104 54,947 42,807 31,404 21,482 7,164 2,697 527 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 151,257 145,454 154,597 165,269 152,681 145,374 99,831 35,595 37,275 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,062 2,945 2,863 2,789 2,499 2,169 1,322 461 445 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 218,778 212,558 209,543 208,076 184,085 166,856 106,994 38,292 37,802 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 52.19% 50.22% 48.82% 47.57% 42.63% 37.01% 22.55% 7.87% 7.59% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 69.14% 68.43% 73.78% 79.43% 82.94% 87.13% 93.30% 92.96% 98.61% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 43,716 41,912 41,256 40,863 36,207 32,480 20,579 7,293 7,181 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 65,628 62,601 78,752 96,159 94,476 97,093 72,855 26,009 28,927 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 41,813 40,842 34,489 28,147 21,899 15,702 6,297 2,192 1,067 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 700 625 625 625 600 500 300 100 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.588 0.565 0.588 0.614 0.563 0.524 0.349 0.124 0.127 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.632 0.608 0.618 0.630 0.573 0.521 0.337 0.119 0.120 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.679 0.653 0.649 0.647 0.584 0.519 0.326 0.114 0.113 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 125 125 125 100 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 125 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 9 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 9 6 7 7 16 - - - - 





APPENDIX D – RESULTS SLIDING SCALE PRODUCTION RATE AND OIL PRICE 
04-1-
PROD_PRICE100%EXPENSED 
No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 51,085 39,751 29,357 19,985 12,468 6,651 2,676 731 212 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 169,724 170,325 161,149 152,641 101,520 107,337 75,150 77,094 39,731 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,227 3,044 2,846 2,508 1,591 1,591 1,075 1,075 544 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 220,809 210,075 190,507 172,625 113,988 113,988 77,825 77,825 39,943 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 54.99% 51.91% 48.54% 42.77% 27.13% 27.13% 18.33% 18.33% 9.28% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 76.86% 81.08% 84.59% 88.42% 89.06% 94.16% 96.56% 99.06% 99.47% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 44,417 41,539 37,994 34,147 22,271 22,271 15,152 15,152 7,743 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 92,634 103,170 102,939 104,160 70,559 79,441 57,137 59,656 30,823 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 32,573 25,515 20,116 14,234 8,590 5,525 2,761 2,186 1,064 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 700 600 600 500 300 300 200 200 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.649 0.642 0.605 0.563 0.370 0.386 0.268 0.273 0.140 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.687 0.668 0.629 0.574 0.373 0.384 0.264 0.267 0.136 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.726 0.696 0.653 0.586 0.376 0.381 0.260 0.262 0.133 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 125 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 8 9 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 9 6 15 - - - - - - 






No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 49,849 38,236 27,642 18,470 11,619 5,754 2,071 212 17 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 160,803 171,243 143,509 126,610 99,693 104,595 72,811 73,675 37,756 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 2,929 2,861 2,311 1,894 1,426 1,386 922 889 444 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 210,653 209,479 171,151 145,080 111,311 110,348 74,882 73,887 37,773 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 49.95% 48.80% 39.42% 32.30% 24.32% 23.64% 15.72% 15.16% 7.58% 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 76.34% 81.75% 83.85% 87.27% 89.56% 94.79% 97.23% 99.71% 99.95% 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 41,547 41,208 33,470 28,120 21,471 21,229 14,339 14,109 7,174 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 87,669 104,530 91,226 85,498 69,700 77,901 55,719 57,435 29,472 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 31,487 25,405 18,713 12,892 8,422 5,364 2,653 2,031 1,010 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 625 625 500 400 300 300 200 200 100 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.609 0.634 0.527 0.456 0.355 0.366 0.252 0.252 0.128 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.637 0.650 0.535 0.455 0.350 0.353 0.241 0.238 0.120 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.667 0.666 0.543 0.453 0.345 0.342 0.230 0.224 0.113 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 125 125 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 100 100 - - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 8 - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 7 7 - - - - - - - 









10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 49,516 37,934 27,125 17,982 10,960 5,114 1,763 260 - 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 163,442 173,021 147,213 135,052 103,029 72,711 38,179 39,683 - 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,095 3,078 2,526 2,161 1,591 1,075 544 544 - 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 212,957 210,955 174,338 153,034 113,988 77,825 39,943 39,943 - 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 52.77% 52.49% 43.06% 36.83% 27.13% 18.33% 9.28% 9.28% - 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 76.75% 82.02% 84.44% 88.25% 90.39% 93.43% 95.59% 99.35% - 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 42,318 41,973 34,458 30,176 22,271 15,152 7,743 7,743 - 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 90,056 106,169 94,725 92,382 72,980 53,574 28,843 31,156 - 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 30,968 24,779 17,930 12,394 7,677 3,885 1,493 684 - 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 625 625 500 425 300 200 100 100 - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.625 0.651 0.549 0.495 0.374 0.261 0.136 0.140 - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.660 0.677 0.566 0.501 0.376 0.260 0.134 0.136 - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.698 0.705 0.584 0.508 0.377 0.258 0.132 0.133 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 125 125 100 125 100 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 100 100 - - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 6 8 - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 7 7 - - - - - - - 









10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 47,649 35,721 25,347 16,238 9,677 4,218 1,319 - - 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 160,227 171,021 144,183 128,842 101,635 71,503 37,410 - - 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 2,882 2,814 2,297 1,894 1,426 952 476 - - 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 207,876 206,743 169,529 145,080 111,311 75,721 38,729 - - 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 49.14% 48.00% 39.18% 32.30% 24.32% 16.23% 8.11% - - 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 77.08% 82.72% 85.05% 88.81% 91.31% 94.43% 96.59% - - 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 40,825 40,496 33,180 28,120 21,471 14,537 7,393 - - 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 89,240 106,627 93,425 88,932 72,688 53,177 28,504 - - 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 30,063 23,799 17,478 11,690 7,376 3,688 1,413 - - 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 600 600 500 400 300 200 100 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.605 0.631 0.528 0.462 0.360 0.250 0.129 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.631 0.644 0.534 0.459 0.353 0.242 0.124 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.658 0.657 0.541 0.455 0.347 0.234 0.118 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 100 100 100 100 100 - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 100 100 100 100 - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 100 100 100 - - - - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 100 100 - - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 9 - - - - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 - - - - - - - 




APPENDIX E – RESULTS SLIDING SCALE R-FACTOR 
05-1-R-
FACTOR100%EXPENSED 
No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 81,489 67,149 52,770 38,315 23,690 8,906 363 2 - 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 193,767 208,107 222,486 236,941 251,567 239,133 147,803 77,824 - 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,617 2,092 1,075 - 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 248,039 148,166 77,825 - 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 61.60% 35.67% 18.33% - 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 70.40% 75.60% 80.83% 86.08% 91.39% 96.41% 99.76% 100.00% - 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 50,644 29,058 15,152 - 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 83,840 105,780 127,720 149,660 171,600 175,392 114,162 60,397 - 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 52,409 44,809 37,248 29,763 22,449 12,997 4,483 2,174 - 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 850 400 200 - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.759 0.800 0.841 0.882 0.923 0.934 0.864 0.525 - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.821 0.851 0.880 0.908 0.936 0.940 0.863 0.516 - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.889 0.905 0.920 0.935 0.949 0.946 0.862 0.507 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - 





No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 80,007 64,966 49,958 35,011 20,171 6,637 179 - - 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 192,655 206,472 219,893 232,826 239,503 207,415 72,578 - - 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,851 3,777 3,696 3,605 3,412 2,673 853 - - 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 272,662 271,438 269,851 267,837 259,675 214,052 72,757 - - 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 65.55% 64.29% 62.92% 61.36% 58.09% 45.57% 14.54% - - 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 70.66% 76.07% 81.49% 86.93% 92.23% 96.90% 99.75% - - 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 56,465 56,075 55,614 55,058 52,971 42,000 13,852 - - 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 83,868 105,854 127,452 148,550 165,391 154,789 56,363 - - 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 52,222 44,444 36,727 29,118 21,042 10,527 2,263 - - 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1000 700 200 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.746 0.782 0.815 0.846 0.852 0.720 0.246 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.799 0.819 0.836 0.850 0.838 0.691 0.231 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.855 0.858 0.857 0.854 0.825 0.663 0.217 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 100 - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - 




05-3-R-FACTOR100%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 80,625 65,467 50,309 35,150 20,258 6,656 350 - - 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 194,631 209,789 224,947 240,106 235,515 219,740 77,476 - - 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048 3,719 3,282 1,075 - - 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 275,256 255,773 226,396 77,825 - - 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 68.88% 63.31% 55.93% 18.33% - - 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 70.71% 76.22% 81.72% 87.23% 92.08% 97.06% 99.55% - - 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 57,418 52,506 45,373 15,152 - - 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 85,385 108,702 132,019 155,336 165,351 165,885 60,899 - - 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 51,728 43,569 35,410 27,253 17,558 8,382 1,324 - - 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 900 700 200 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.761 0.805 0.848 0.891 0.860 0.791 0.274 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.823 0.855 0.885 0.914 0.868 0.788 0.268 - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.890 0.907 0.923 0.938 0.876 0.785 0.262 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - 




05-4-R-FACTOR50%SL20Y No tax Base tax 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
NPV Company 276,553 136,130 77,746 61,779 45,832 29,998 15,303 3,016 - - - 
NPV Gov. - 139,127 194,916 209,660 224,019 228,501 208,431 166,831 - - - 
Total Production 4,206 4,048 3,851 3,777 3,696 3,452 2,873 2,082 - - - 
Total Project Value 276,553 275,256 272,662 271,438 269,851 258,499 223,734 169,847 - - - 
% produced total reserves 71.56% 68.88% 65.55% 64.29% 62.92% 58.77% 48.96% 35.51% - - - 
Government Take 0.00% 50.54% 71.49% 77.24% 83.02% 88.40% 93.16% 98.22% - - - 
Disc Royalty - 57,418 56,465 56,075 55,614 52,728 44,315 32,746 - - - 
Disc Gov. Profit Oil - - 87,347 110,761 133,811 150,324 149,057 127,939 - - - 
Disc Corp. Tax - 81,609 51,004 42,724 34,495 25,350 14,959 6,046 - - - 
Total Capacity 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 975 750 500 - - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.75) - 0.592 0.753 0.791 0.827 0.825 0.736 0.575 - - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.50) - 0.696 0.804 0.825 0.844 0.824 0.718 0.547 - - - 
Gov. Utility (α=0.25) - 0.818 0.858 0.861 0.861 0.823 0.701 0.521 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO1 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO2 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO3 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO4 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO5 175 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - 
Initial Capacity FPSO6 175 175 175 175 175 100 100 - - - - 
Start year FPSO1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - 
Start year FPSO2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - - 
Start year FPSO3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - 
Start year FPSO4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - - - 
Start year FPSO5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - 
Start year FPSO6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - - - 




APPENDIX F – MODEL EQUATIONS 
 
- Government Utility (objective function) 
,,,,, ,!,"#$%& = ∝ ∗ )*+,- 
Where:  = ./	0	12.		1.	34	5	6.	4  = ./	0	12.		12.6	5	..3	273		1	42	 8 = 	6.	4./3/.9	:/6ℎ.	5	< )1 − 8- 	= 	6.	4./3/.9	:/6ℎ.	5	< 
 
- Government Decisions 






ρ,V → 3/	/6	23	 − 52. 	
τ,X 	= 	initial	percentage	of	government	share, decided	at	time	zero	)j	 = 	1, … , 9- 
Where: 
τ,* 	→ //./3	12.6 = 10% 
τ,S 	→ //./3	12.6 = 20% 
… 
τ,] 	→ //./3	12.6 = 90% 
 
θ,^ 	= 	cost	recovery	percentage	limit, decided	at	time	zero	)m	 = 	1,2-	
Where: 
θ,* → 	3//.	5	2.	29	 → 	θ,* = 100%	
θ,S → 50%	3//.	5	2.	29	 → 	θ,S = 50% 	
γ,` 	= 	cost	recovery	schedule	for	CAPEX, decided	at	time	zero	)n = 1,2-	
Where: 
γ,* → ghi	29	/	1		 





- Contractors Utility Function  
 ,,,,t,#%
=  	Îù	)g.2k)Ωk-- + )gm/3k)Ωk-- 	− ))ghik)Ωk-- + )mik)Ωk--qkr*
+ )hjik)Ωk-- + )g1k)Ωk--	-	 ∗ +stkÏ 
 
 
Where: g.2k)nk- = g.	29, .	./	.	gm/3k)nk- = 219	ℎ	5	15/.	/3, .	./	.	ghik)nk- = 21/.3	2., .	./	.	mik)nk- = 1./3	2., .	./	.	hjik)nk- = 1//	5	7	.	2., .	./	.	g1k)nk- = 		21.	., .	./	.	k = /	5	., .	./	.	 = ./3	1/		5	2.2.	
 
 
- Contractors Decisions 
 ,~ 	= 	.ℎ	9	5	/.33./	5	2ℎ	m, decided	at	time	zero	)5 = 1,… ,-;	
Where: 0 ≥ ,~ ≥ T ,~ < ,~ *  = 47	5		43	5	1	42./	.	7	/.33		/	.ℎ	5/3	 	q,v 	= production	capacity	of	each	FPSO, decided	at	time	zero		)f = 1,… ,-;	
Where: 100,000 ≥ ,~ ≥ 175,000	7		 	k,~ 	= 	.ℎ	9	5	7	.	5	2ℎ	m, 	2/			.	./	.	)5 = 1,… ,-. 
Where: ,~ + 2 ≥	 k,~ ≥ T 
 
 
- The state variable (ûü) 
The state variable at time t (Ωu) reflects the interaction of government decisions at time 
zero (ρ,?	, τ,X	,θ,^	, γ,`), companies decision at time zero (n,v	, q,v- and at time t (su,v- 
and the projects uncertainties (pxu, R{v, CI{ u). 
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Ωk = f)ρ,?	, τ,X	, θ,^	, γ,`, ,~	, ,~ , k,~ , 1k , y~ , g¦ýk, , .-	  
Stochastic processes: 1k = /43.		/		4.		/3	1.	1/2	.	./	. − 4./	4.45	y,,~ = 			:	5	.ℎ	29	.	5	2ℎ	m, .	./	. = ,~	g¦ýk, = /		5	2.	23./, .	./	. − 4./	4.49	)2 = 1,2,3-		
 
Where: g¦ýk,* = /		5	ghi	2.	23./	.	./	.	g¦ýk,S = /		5	mi	2.	23./	.	./	.	g¦ýk,T = /		5	hji	2.	23./	.	./	.	
 
 
- Expected present value of the government revenue - þ	
)- =  Îj +ù)9k)Ωk-- + )m/3k)Ωk--qkr + )g1k)Ωk-- ∗ +stkÏ 
 
Where: j = 	.//./2	/6.4	74	9k)nk- = 		93.9		.	./	.	m/3k)nk- = 	6.	15/.	/3		.	./	.	g1k)nk- = 	21.	.	.	./	.	
 
 
Signature bonus (Bon- is assumed to be a fixed value (B) paid once at time zero. 
j = 	$	B	 
Royalty (Royu)Ωu-- is a fixed percentage of the gross revenue. 
9k)Ωk- = ∅ ∗ k)Ωk-  
Where:  ∅ = 93.9	.	)%- k)Ωk- = 6	4, .	./	.	 
 
and 
k)Ωk- = 	1k ∗	}k)Ωk- 




Corporate Tax )CorpTaxu)Ωu-- is a fixed percentage of net income less depreciation and 
previous period losses. 
 g1k)nk- = 	{0,  ∗ g7k)nk- −	g1k)nk-} g7k)nk- = 	k)nk- − )jk + 9k)nk- 	+ m/3k)nk- + ghik)nk- +	mik)nk-+ hjik)nk-- g1k)nk- = /	{g4k+*)nk-	, 0.3 ∗ g7k)nk-} g4k)nk- = 	k)nk- + 	g4k+*)nk- − g1k+*)nk- 
 
Where:  = 21.	.	.	)%- g7k)Ωk- = 21.	.	7, .	./	.  g1k)nk- = 3	.	21., .	./	. g4k)nk- = 2443./	3, .	./	. k)nk- = 3, .	./	. m/3k)nk- = 6.	15/.	/3	4, .	./	. ghik)nk- = 	12/./	5	21/.3	2., .	./	. mik)nk- = 1./3	2., .	./	. hjik)nk- = 1//	5	7	.	2., .	./	. 
 
Capital cost depreciation for corporate tax proposes (ghik)nk-) is the sum of the 
CAPEX depreciation of each module of production (	1_ghik,~)nk-) calculated 
according to a straight line 20 years depreciation schedule starting after the installation 
of each module of production. In case of early abandonment before 20 years there is no 
white-off.  
ghik)Ωk- = 	ù	1_ghik,~)nk-~r*  
Where for each module of production: 
	1_ghik,~)nk- = 		 0.05 ∗ ghikr
,,~	)nk- → 		/5	,~ ≥ . > ),~ + 20-			. ≤ k,~																											0																								 → 	/5	. < ,~		. > ,~ + 20		. > k,~ 
 
Operational cost for corporate tax proposes (mik)nk-) is the sum of the operational 
cost of each module of production (mik,~)nk-) at the period t. 




Provision to abandonment cost for corporate tax proposes (hjik)nk-) is the sum of 
the provision to abandonment of each module of production (1_hjik,~)nk-) 
calculated according a Units of Production (UOP) schedule. 
hjik)Ωk- = 	ù1_hjik,~)nk-~r*  
Cost Recovery (g.2k)Ωk-- is the share of the production owed by the contractors in 
compensation to the amount of investment and cost of the project. 
g.2k)Ωk- = min	{	g.//.k)Ωk-, g.2k)Ωk-} g.//.k)Ωk- = 	k)Ωk- ∗ )1 − ∅- ∗ , g.2k)Ωk- = γ,`ghik)Ωk- + mik)Ωk- +	hjik)Ωk- +	g..2k+*)Ωk- g..2k)Ωk- = g.2k)Ωk- −	g.2k)Ωk- 
 
Where:  g.2k)Ωk- = 4.	5	1	42./	.	7	332.			g.	29, .	./	.	 g.//.k)Ωk- = 	6	4	33:		.	7	4			g.	29, .	./	.	 g.2k)Ωk- = ..3	2.	.	7	2	, .	./	.	 g..2k)Ωk- = 2.	.	7	2		.ℎ.	2		.ℎ	g.	2	3//., .	./	.	 
γ,`ghik)Ωk- = ghi	5	2.	29, .	./	. mik)Ωk- = 1./3	2., .	./	.	 hjik)Ωk- = 1//	5	7	.	2., .	./	. 
 
 
The value of the capital cost for cost recovery (γ,`CAPEXu)Ωu-), will dependent on the 
government decision over the cost recovery schedule (γ,`). 
 




 If γ,* → ghi	29	/	1		, then 
 
2_ghik,~)nk- 	= 		 ghikr
,,~	)nk- → 		/5	. = ,~																											0																								 → 	/5	. ≠ ,~	 
 




2_ghik,~)nk- 	= 		 0.05 ∗ ghikr
,,~	)nk- → 		/5	,~ ≥ . > ),~ + 20-			. ≤ k,~																											0																								 → 	/5	. < ,~		. > ,~ + 20		. > k,~ 
 
Government Profit Oil (m/3k)Ωk-- is the share of the profit oil that goes to the 
government. Companies profit oil (gm/3k)Ωk-- is the share of the profit oil that goes to 
the company. 
 m/3k)Ωk- = Γ,k ∗ m/3k)Ωk- gm/3k)Ωk- = )1 − Γ,k- ∗ m/3k)Ωk- m/3k)Ωk- = max		{0, )k)Ωk--)1 − ∅- − g.2k)Ωk-} 




- Fixed percentage: Γ*,k =	,*	 
 
- Sliding scale cumulative production 
ΓS,k = 5 ã,S	,ù})Ωk-	kr è 
Below 500 MMbbl τ,S 
From 500 to 1500 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+10%, 96%) 
From 1500 to 3000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+20%, 96%) 
From 3000 to 4000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+30%, 96%) 
From 4000 to 5000 MMbbl Min{τ0,2+40%, 96%) 







- Sliding scale current production t=rate ΓT,k = 5T	, }k)Ωk- 
Below 50 MMbbl/y τ0,3 
From 50 to 100 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+10%, 96%) 
From 100 to 150 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+20%, 96%) 
From 150 to 200 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+30%, 96%) 
Above 200 MMbbl/y Min{τ0,3+40%, 96%) 
 
- Sliding scale current production and price ΓU,k = 5,U	, }k)Ωk-	, 1k 
 
Below 
 US$ 75 bbl 
From US$ 75 
to 85 bbl 
From U$ 85 to 
95 bbl 
From U$ 95 to 
110 bbl 
Above  





























































- Sliding scale R-factor 
ΓV,k = 5 ã,V	,ù)Ωk-	kr ,ùgg.)Ωk-	
k
r è 
Below 1 τ0,5 
From 1 to 1.25 Min{τ0,5+5%, 96%) 
From 1.25 to 1.50 Min{τ0,5+10%, 96%) 
From 1.50 to 1.75 Min{τ0,5+15%, 96%) 
From 1.75 to 2 Min{τ0,5+20%, 96%) 
From 2 to 2.50 Min{τ0,5+25%, 96%) 
Above 2.5 Min{τ0,5+30%, 96%) 
 




- Expected percentage of the recoverable reserves produced -  
 
EPerRes = 	∑ }k)Ωk-qkr∑ y~~r*  
Where:  }k)Ωk- = ..3	1	42./	5	.ℎ	5/3	, .	./	. y~ = 1ℎ9/2339	273		5	2ℎ	m	)5 = 1,… ,-		
 
 
- Cost and Investment 
Capital cost of each module of production (CAPEXu,v) is paid at the year of installation 
(n,v), calculated by the cost of capital cost corresponding the initial capacity size 
(CAPEXq,v), according to second column of table 5.1, multiplied by the index of 
capital cost escalation at the period (g¦ýk,*). 
 
ghik,~)Ωk- = 	ghi,~ ∗ g¦ýk,* → /5		. = 	,~																											0										 → /5	. ≠ 	 ,~  
 
Operational cost of each module of production (OPEXu,v)Ωu-) has a fixed and variable 
components, paid every period that the module of production is operating. The fixed 
operating cost is corresponding the initial capacity size (fix_OPEXq,v), according to 
third column of table 5.1, and the variable is the initial cost per barrel (ñò),~-- 
time the current production. Both operational costs are multiplied by the index of 
operational cost escalation at the period (g¦ýk,S). 
 
mik,~)Ωk- = 	)5/_mi,~ + _mi),~- ∗ xk,~)Ωk-- ∗ g¦ýk,S → /5		. ≤ k,~																									0																																																									 → /5	. > k,~  
 
Provision to abandonment cost (hjik,~)Ωk-) is calculated according to the unit of 
production (UOP) method for each module of production. The total value to be 
provisioned is corresponding the initial capacity size (ABEXq,v), according to fifth 
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column of table 5.1, and the provision at each period is multiplied by the index of 






																												hi,~ ∗  xk,~äññíò ∗ y~å ∗ g¦ýk,T 														→ /5		. < k,~
																						hi,~ ∗ 1 −  ∑ xk,~TUkräññíò ∗ y~å ∗ g¦ýk,T → /5		. = k,~																									0																																																									 → /5	. > k,~
 
 
- Production function 
xk,~ = ,~+¢xk 
Where: xk,~ = 		1	4./	5	m, .	./	.	)5 = 1,… ,6-	,~ = 5/		1	42./	212/.9		5	m, .	./	.	)5 = 1,… ,6-	x~ = 			23/	.	5	m	)5 = 1,… ,6-		
 x~ = ,~y~  
}yk =ùxk,~qkr*  
- Risk-adjusted oil price discrete simulation 
htÞt = 1«k∗ + ÒÓ∗Δ. + ªk∗+ØÍk ∗ 1ÔÓ√Δ.<k + ÔÙ1 − +SØÍk2 ßk 
- Cost escalation discrete simulation 
g¦	). + ∆.- = g¦).- ∗ exp  ÀÒ − ÔS2 Á∆. + Ôk√∆.! 
- Recovery rate uncertainty  
y~ = 	mm¦ ∗ ð~ 
 
